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COPYRIGHT AND THE BRAIN 
MARK BARTHOLOMEW* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the intersection of copyright law, aesthetic theory, 
and neuroscience. The current test for copyright infringement requires a 
court or jury to assess whether the parties’ works are “substantially 
similar” from the vantage point of the “ordinary observer.” Embedded 
within this test are several assumptions about audiences and art. Brain 
science calls these assumptions into question. The substantial similarity test 
posits that aesthetic reactions are unmeasurable and uniform. In actuality, 
they can be quantified and vary depending on audience and artistic medium. 
Neuroscience has already reconfigured the law in many areas, from tort 
damages to the death penalty. Now it may offer copyright law a way 
forward, opening up the black box of aesthetic encounters to reveal what is 
most salient when making the comparison at the heart of copyright 
infringement. Three suggested reforms—admitting expert testimony to 
tailor the substantial similarity test to different kinds of artistic works, using 
survey evidence to better understand the aesthetic responses of specialized 
audiences, and reordering the infringement analysis to debias judges and 
jurors—deploy the insights of neuroaesthetics to improve the law of 
copyright infringement.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Nobody likes the current test for copyright infringement. A court or jury 
determining whether illegal copying occurred must assess whether the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s works are “substantially similar” from the 
vantage point of the “ordinary observer.”1 A frequent punching bag for 
intellectual property scholars, the substantial similarity test has been 
described as “mak[ing] no sense,”2 “notoriously confusing and confused,”3 
 
1. See, e.g., Tanksley v. Daniels, 902 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2018); Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 
883 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018). 
2. Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010). 
3. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 













and “a virtual black hole in copyright jurisprudence.”4 
Judges feel no better about the test. Early on, a court complained of the 
ordinary observer analysis’s “artificial and disappointingly inaccurate 
application.”5 Another prophesized that the test would prevent judges and 
juries from making “an intelligible and intellectual decision” on the question 
of infringement.6 The passage of time did not make things any better. One 
court of appeals deemed the test “of doubtful value” given its interplay with 
other parts of copyright law.7 Or, as another court opined, the “essential 
question” of how to compare two works for purposes of substantial 
similarity has not been answered “[a]fter 200 years of wrestling with 
copyright questions, [and] it is unlikely that courts will come up with the 
answer any time soon, if indeed there is ‘an’ answer, which we doubt.”8 
To a large degree, these complaints reflect a larger skepticism of the 
ability of one person to comprehend the aesthetic experience of another. The 
substantial similarity test, also referred to as the “audience test,”9 requires 
art to be appreciated from the perspective of its intended audience. As 
formulated by the federal courts, “the essence of the audience test is its focus 
on viewers’ spontaneous reaction” to the infringing work.10 These courts 
assume that human reactions to art are inherently subjective and, therefore, 
not susceptible to objective analysis or outside expertise. 
As a result, decisionmaking in copyright cases remains particularly 
opaque as courts largely abdicate any role in policing what can be relied on 
when comparing the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works. 11  This has 
negative consequences, including making infringement disputes 
unpredictable and difficult to resolve before trial. 12  Rather than base 
copyright infringement on a phenomenon incapable of measurement, some 
law professors, including the author of the most-cited treatise on copyright 
 
4. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement Analysis, 
68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2016). 
5. Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1938). 
6. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 476 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
7. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232–33 (3d Cir. 1986). 
8. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990). 
9. Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 854 (6th Cir. 2003). 
10. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[E][3][a][ii] 
(2019). 
11. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (“The test 
for infringement of copyright is of necessity vague.”); see also Blehm v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d 1193, 1202 
(10th Cir. 2012) (“We have not defined the ‘outer limits’ of substantial similarity, likely because the line 
between substantial similarity and no substantial similarity is imprecise.”); Lyons P’ship v. Morris 
Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 2001) (admitting that “[t]he notion of intrinsic similarity 
can be a slippery one”). 
12. Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1870 (2018); Pamela 
Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 
1837 (2013); Lemley, supra note 2, at 739–40. 












law, call for the audience test’s wholesale abandonment.13 
Maybe there is a way to rehabilitate copyright infringement doctrine 
without junking the audience test. Brain science offers the potential for a 
much richer portrait of the aesthetic experience. “Neuroaesthetics is the 
study of the neural processes that underlie aesthetic behavior.” 14 
Neuroscientists have identified several regions and processes in the brain 
central to appreciating creative works and are continuing to develop the 
field.15 Using new technologies for measuring blood flow and electrical 
activity in the brain, researchers examine the neural indicia of attention, 
novelty, emotional response, and even the perception of beauty that are part 
of the aesthetic experience. In this way, brain science may offer copyright 
law a way forward, opening up the black box of aesthetic encounters to 
reveal which things are most salient when making the comparison at the 
heart of copyright infringement. 
This is not to say that brain scans have suddenly laid bare the entire 
process of aesthetic judgment. Today’s imaging technologies lack the 
spatial resolution and speed needed to capture all of the complexities of 
human thought, including thoughts about art, music, and literature. The 
brain regions and processes identified as being part of the aesthetic 
experience also perform other functions, making it difficult to determine 
which neural processes are central to aesthetic judgment.16 
Nevertheless, the recent development of non-invasive techniques for 
recording the biological incidents of human thought has surfaced many 
insights into the experiences of audiences that were not available even a few 
years ago.17 Much of the neurological activity that is involved in aesthetic 
appreciation is subconscious. As a result, reports from audience members 
themselves cannot do this activity justice. Brain imaging offers a window 
into aesthetic encounters that we are unable to articulate ourselves.18 The 
 
13. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.03[E][1][b] (“It would seem preferable, in 
short, to discard the audience test.”); Lemley, supra note 2, at 740–41; Tushnet, supra note 3, at 687–
88. 
14. Martin Skov & Oshin Vartanian, Introduction: What Is Neuroaesthetics?, in 
NEUROAESTHETICS 1, 3 (Martin Skov & Oshin Vartanian eds., 2009). 
15. Marcus T. Pearce, Dahlia W. Zaidel, Oshin Vartanian, Martin Skov, Helmut Leder, Anjan 
Chatterjee & Marcos Nadal, Neuroaesthetics: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience, 11 
PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCH. SCI. 265, 274 (2016) (“[R]ecent studies show that aesthetic pleasure is 
characterized by the tight coupling of activity in reward brain regions and sensory brain regions.”); Mark 
Reybrouck, Peter Vuust & Elvira Brattico, Brain Connectivity Networks and the Aesthetic Experience 
of Music, 107 BRAIN SCI. 10 of 14 (2018) (describing “target regions in the brain” that are activated in 
the aesthetic reaction to music). 
16. See infra notes 225–226 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra Part II.B. 
18. See Robert L. Solso, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Art: A Preliminary fMRI Observation, 













substantial similarity analysis is based on judicial suppositions as to how 
audiences perceive creative works as well as a belief that the aesthetic 
experience cannot be measured. Neuroaesthetic research can confirm or 
refute these judicial hunches with new, objective measures of art 
appreciation that copyright law has long assumed could never exist.19 By 
showing that our reactions to art can be measured, neuroscientific 
discoveries should force an immediate reconsideration of copyright law’s 
current prohibitions on the use of survey evidence and expert testimony to 
better understand the audiences for creative works. By demonstrating that 
our aesthetic reactions to art are formed quickly, brain science suggests that 
the trier of fact should evaluate substantial similarity at the outset of a case, 
not after days of testimony on other issues. 
Neuroscience has already reconfigured the law in many areas outside of 
copyright and appears poised for significant future influence. “[L]awyers 
are introducing so-called neurobiological evidence into court more than 
ever.”20 Thanks to studies of the plasticity of the developing brain, some 
criminal punishments for juvenile offenders are no longer allowed.21 The 
vast field of tort law now takes fMRI imaging into account; such images 
were credited with forcing the National Football League into a settlement 
with thousands of former players suffering from Chronic Traumatic 
Encephalopathy. 22  Perhaps most analogous to the relationship between 
neuroaesthetics and copyright, another intellectual property regime, 
trademark law, appears poised to embrace neuroscientific evidence of 
consumer perception.23 
In many ways, copyright and its problematic infringement test represent 
a particularly promising legal territory for neuroscientific analysis. It is true 
that the intricacies of aesthetic judgment mean that it is extremely difficult 
to know what a single person is thinking when staring at a picture or 
listening to a song. Fortunately, the substantial similarity analysis does not 
require a perfect understanding of one person’s aesthetic experience. 
 
19. ANJAN CHATTERJEE, THE AESTHETIC BRAIN 137 (2014) (describing neuroaesthetic study “of 
aesthetic properties of objects, properties that are objective but evoke an aesthetic experience within 
us”). 
20. Robbie Gonzalez, How Criminal Courts Are Putting Brains—Not People—On Trial, WIRED 
(Dec. 4, 2017). 
21. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 n.5 (2012) (barring mandatory life-without-parole 
sentence for juvenile offenders in homicide cases); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–74 (2010) 
(barring mandatory life-without-parole sentence for juvenile offenders in non-homicide cases); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–78 (2005) (barring the death penalty for crimes committed by juvenile 
offenders). 
22. Joseph J. Avery, Picking and Choosing: Inconsistent Use of Neuroscientific Legal Evidence, 
81 ALB. L. REV. 941, 959–60 (2018). 
23. Mark Bartholomew, Neuromarks, 103 MINN. L. REV. 521, 524–28 (2018). 












Instead, the audience test depends on an aggregate sense of what audiences 
will think. This stands in sharp contrast to criminal law, where legal 
determinations typically hinge on the mental state of a single person. If 
neuroscientific evidence has already influenced criminal-law 
determinations, it stands to reason that this sort of evidence may be even 
more useful in an area like copyright law where the trier of fact only needs 
a general sense of an audience’s overall mental state.24 
This Article begins by exploring the centrality of audience reactions to 
copyright infringement. Even though the experience of audiences forms the 
linchpin of every infringement claim, this critical component of copyright 
law has attracted relatively little academic attention. Part I explains how the 
substantial similarity test requires courts and jurors to engage in a fraught 
and uncertain exercise: a channeling of the thought processes of relevant 
audience members. By and large, the test for infringement assumes a one-
size-fits-all approach to aesthetic encounters. Whether juror or judge, the 
assumption seems to be that one’s own subjective processing of the works 
at issue will translate into the same broadly applicable reactions as the 
original audience for the works at issue. Neuroaesthetics challenges this 
universalist take. Recent studies reveal that reactions to art differ depending 
on audience and on the type of creative work being processed by that 
audience. 
Part II demonstrates that substantial similarity also depends on certain 
judicial assumptions about how human beings experience art. Courts insist 
that the subjective nature of art appreciation renders it impossible to 
measure. They also posit that aesthetic responses occur rapidly and are 
stable. Both of these assumptions help justify the current legal approach, 
which disclaims lengthy deliberation over the qualities of creative works 
and bars expert testimony to aid the trier of fact’s substantial similarity 
analysis. Although brain imaging confirms that our impressions of creative 
works form quickly, fMRI and EEG readings show that this process does 
not have to remain impervious to outside observation. 
Part III turns to a normative account of the future intersection of 
copyright law and neuroscience and recommends some related doctrinal 
reforms. Although it is tempting to believe that any tool facilitating a better 
understanding of audiences should be embraced by the courts, there are 
 
24. At this point, brain scans are most useful for proving and disproving general theories about 
aesthetic appreciation, not for answering questions about a particular copyright dispute. It may be years 
before this research can be directly employed to adjudicate individual cases and, even then, it could only 
serve as an evidentiary supplement, not a replacement, for the trier of fact. In the immediate term, 














reasons for caution. We may not always trust audiences (or legal 
decisionmakers channeling those audiences) to decide when a defendant’s 
borrowing from the creative work of another is improper.25  Ultimately, 
where to set the line between acceptable and unacceptable copying is a 
question of policy, which neuroscience can inform but not determine.  
Yet if we conclude that the copyright infringement analysis warrants 
some assessment of aesthetic reactions—and such assessment may be 
unavoidable given copyright’s artistic subject matter—then the law should 
be changed to make these assessments more transparent and better aligned 
with the ways our minds actually work. Insights into the biology of aesthetic 
reaction counsel three specific doctrinal reforms. Experts should be allowed 
to help the trier of fact understand which aspects of a work will be most 
salient to a target audience. Survey evidence should be admitted to allow 
judges and juries to appreciate the variability in audience reactions that the 
law has thus far ignored. The trier of fact should judge substantial similarity 
quickly so as to better mimic the fast, casual review of creative works that 
characterizes actual aesthetic appreciation outside of the courtroom.  
I. UNDERSTANDING AUDIENCES 
Jimi Hendrix first met fifteen-year-old guitarist Randy Wolfe in a New 
York City music store in 1966. After some talking and jamming together, 
the as-yet-unknown Hendrix invited Wolfe (whom he dubbed “Randy 
California”) to sit in with his band.26 Shortly thereafter, the two had a falling 
out. Hendrix moved on to superstardom. Wolfe formed a band named Spirit 
that had some success, including a top 40 hit. But he never quite cracked the 
big time like Hendrix.  
Wolfe died in a drowning accident in 1997,27 but his music lives on in 
many ways, including in the form of a blockbuster lawsuit against iconic 
rock band Led Zeppelin. Wolfe’s estate sued Led Zeppelin for copyright 
infringement, contending that Led Zeppelin’s song “Stairway to Heaven” 
copied key portions of Wolfe’s song “Taurus.” “Stairway to Heaven” is 
often rated the greatest rock song of all time, enjoying more sheet music 
 
25. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 294 (1998) 
(“Indeed, courts generally refuse to consider evidence of how actual people appraise the similarity 
between two works precisely because those appraisals may not be appropriate for copyright law.”); see 
also Fishman, supra note 12, at 1903–04 (calling for a focus only on melody for music copyright cases 
even though such a focus does not match the aesthetic experience of listeners). 
26. Pierre Perrone, Obituary: Randy California, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 17, 1997), https://www 
.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-randy-california-1283572.html. 
27. Id. 












sales and radio play than virtually any other musical composition.28 The 
lawyer for Wolfe’s estate estimated that his lawsuit against Led Zeppelin 
was worth $40 million.29 
The dispute over “Stairway to Heaven” exemplifies many of the 
frustrations courts and commentators have with the current state of 
copyright infringement law. Even in high-stakes cases, the trier of fact’s 
substantial similarity analysis remains largely unknowable and 
underdetermined. After an initial verdict for Led Zeppelin, a Ninth Circuit 
panel reversed, faulting the trial court for failing to instruct jurors that they 
could find infringement based on Wolfe’s original selection or arrangement 
of otherwise uncopyrightable musical elements.30 Yet some commentators 
fretted such an instruction would backfire. Concerned over the jurors’ lack 
of musical experience, these commentators thought the new instruction 
would prompt the jury to wrongly base its substantial similarity decision on 
uncopyrightable stock motifs appearing in both works.31  More broadly, 
even though the California jury hearing the case was supposed to determine 
“whether the ordinary, reasonable person would find the total concept and 
feel of the works to be substantially similar,”32 one might wonder whether 
a different group of listeners—perhaps ones with more musical expertise or 
more familiarity with 1970s rock and roll—would have a different reaction 
 
28. James Joiner, Did Zeppelin Steal “Stairway to Heaven?”, ESQUIRE (May 19, 2014), https://w 
ww.esquire.com/entertainment/music/news/a32855/was-stairway-to-heaven-stolen/ [https://perma.cc/Z 
K82-VPGM]. 
29. Kory Grow, Led Zeppelin Win in “Stairway to Heaven” Trial, ROLLING STONE (June 23, 
2016, 5:27 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/led-zeppelin-win-in-stairway-to-hea 
ven-trial-70565/. 
30. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2018). The Ninth Circuit elected 
to hear the case en banc. It reversed the panel, concluding that there was no need for a jury instruction 
as to Wolfe’s selection and arrangement given that the jury had already received instruction that an “an 
original work may include or incorporate elements taken from prior works or works from the public 
domain.” Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1071 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). A vigorous dissent 
maintained that failure to require a selection and arrangement instruction “weakens copyright protection 
for musicians by robbing them of the ability to protect a unique way of combining musical elements.” 
Id. at 1089 (Ikuta, J., dissenting in part). 
31. Steve Brachman, Ninth Circuit Vacates and Remands “Stairway to Heaven” Copyright Case 
Over Erroneous and Prejudicial Jury Instructions, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.ipwatchd 
og.com/2018/10/06/ninth-circuit-vacates-remands-verdict-in-stairway-to-heaven-copyright-case/id=10 
1920/ [https://perma.cc/5NVJ-GM42]; Mike Masnick, Ninth Circuit Never Misses a Chance to Mess Up 
Copyright Law: Reopens Led Zeppelin “Stairway to Heaven” Case, TECHDIRT (Oct. 1, 2018, 9:33 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180928/18021040739/9th-circuit-never-misses-chance-to-mess-u 
p-copyright-law-reopens-led-zeppelin-stairway-to-heaven-case.shtml [https://perma.cc/8LYL-54H9]; 
see also Anne Steele, Music Industry Braces for More Lawsuits on Copyrights, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 
2019, at B1 (describing concern that $2.8 million infringement verdict against Katy Perry and her 
collaborators is symptomatic of copyright infringement decisions that unfairly punish artists for using 
musical elements in the public domain). 













to the two songs and reach an entirely different verdict.33 
As the Led Zeppelin case illustrates, substantial similarity requires 
difficult line drawing from judges while at the same time offering little 
guidance or predictability for litigants. The problem largely lies in the 
decision to make a particular kind of audience reaction the centerpiece of 
copyright infringement without any corresponding way to ascertain the 
inputs that make up that reaction. One might think that every copyright jury 
should be instructed in how to appreciate the perspective of the relevant 
audience. Instead, given “the abstract and intuitive nature” of the audience 
test, no federal court of appeals provides district courts with model jury 
instructions on the question of substantial similarity.34 The Led Zeppelin 
jury, like all triers of fact in copyright infringement disputes, faced the 
daunting task of trying to recreate an audience’s experience with creative 
works with no tools for understanding that experience save their own 
personal responses to those works. As the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the 
substantial similarity analysis demands a “subjective” comparison of the 
two works, seemingly closing the door on any attempts to more precisely 
identify what an audience for Wolfe’s work would find most relevant when 
comparing it to “Stairway to Heaven.”35 
This Part details the centrality of audience understanding to the test for 
copyright infringement and explains how neuroscience can facilitate that 
understanding. Substantial similarity must be assessed from the perspective 
of the intended audience for the works at issue. Courts struggle both with 
how to adopt the audience’s perspective and when a case warrants a 
specialized approach to audience understanding. History is important here: 
by seeing how the law changed over time, we can better appreciate the 
assumptions about audiences embedded in today’s substantial similarity 
doctrine. Neuroaesthetic research challenges those assumptions, 
particularly the law’s insistence on the universality of our reactions to 
creative works. 
A. The Role of the Audience in Copyright Law 
Copyright’s early history reflected a belief that judges could assess 
similarity on their own terms and a belief that their study of the works at 
issue did not need to be filtered through the gaze of an audience. In the early 
 
33. Stephen Carlisle, Stairway to Nowhere: Court Reverses Verdict in Favor of Led Zeppelin, 
NOVA (Oct. 11, 2018), http://copyright.nova.edu/led-zeppelin/ (“The underpinnings of music theory are 
complex, and not easily understood by people who are not musicians.”).  
34. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina D. Manta & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Judging Similarity, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 267, 274–75 (2014). 
35. Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1125. 












twentieth century, courts confidently determined when “the same 
impressions will be created, and the same emotions excited” by two works.36 
Substantial similarity could be evaluated without regard for audience 
sensibilities. Instead, the task of the judge was simply to compare the works 
and determine if the defendant had borrowed too heavily from the plaintiff. 
This permitted the judge to engage in an exacting scrutiny of the two works; 
there was no need to avoid such scrutiny out of fear that this was not the 
way the works would be processed by their actual audience. 
An early illustrative example comes from the case of Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp.37 The district court judge in that matter justified his 
refusal to trust the audience’s perspective over his own as well as his 
decision that a film was not substantially similar to the plaintiff’s play this 
way: 
I must, as the trier of the facts, have a more Olympian viewpoint than 
the average playgoer. I must look at the two opposing productions, 
the Play and the Picture, not only comparatively, but, as it were, 
genealogically.38 
In review, a Second Circuit panel disagreed with the judge’s take, but 
simply replaced one “Olympian viewpoint” with another, opining that it 
knew infringement had occurred because “the dramatic significance of the 
scenes [in the two works] is the same, almost to the letter.”39 
The district judge’s temerity to nakedly assert the right to decide the case 
from his particular perspective and the Second Circuit’s willingness to 
interpose its own view stands in sharp contrast to the modern instruction 
that substantial similarity must be evaluated through the senses of the 
ordinary observer.40 Most trace the arrival of the ordinary observer test to 
 
36. Curwood v. Affiliated Distribs., Inc., 283 F. 223, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). 
37. 7 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), rev’d, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). 
38. Id. at 842.  
39. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936). 
40. Even when courts in this earlier era mentioned that works should be evaluated based on the 
impressions they made on spectators, this was meant to train the trier of fact’s attention on how the 
author intended for the work to be experienced, not to channel the sensations of intended audience 
members. For example, the case of Daly v. Palmer is sometimes credited as the source of the modern-
day audience test. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.03[E][2]. But that case did not “ask the 
judge to put him or herself in the place of a hypothetical and undiscerning ‘ordinary’ observer.” Bruce 
E. Boyden, Daly v. Palmer, or the Melodramatic Origins of the Ordinary Observer, 68 SYR. L. REV. 
147, 165 (2018). Rather, because Palmer was a case about rival plays, the judge in that case explained 
that he had “to focus attention on the play as performed as opposed to the play as written.” Id. So far as 
possible, one was meant to experience the play as presented on the stage, not simply read its underlying 
script. Substantial similarity analysis in this era did not demand adopting the perspective of an average 
audience member though it did require the judge to experience the work for himself in a similar fashion 













the case of Arnstein v. Porter.41 Though drawing on strands of earlier case 
law that highlighted the perspective of the audience,42 Arnstein cemented 
the move to determine infringement based on the impressions of an ordinary 
audience member, a doctrinal innovation that has achieved “canonical 
status” in copyright jurisprudence.43 
Ira Arnstein was a musical composer with a paranoid streak. In the 1930s 
and 1940s, he launched a wave of copyright infringement lawsuits against 
various well-known composers and publishers. His complaints against these 
musical luminaries not only alleged infringement of his compositions, but 
also included other provocative allegations. In 1945, he filed a lawsuit 
against famed composer and songwriter Cole Porter. Not only had Porter 
wrongfully appropriated his musical works, Arnstein contended, but he had 
also hired “stooges . . . to follow me, watch me, and live in the same 
apartment with me.”44 
Porter moved for summary judgment, which was granted by a federal 
district court. Arnstein appealed the district court’s decision to the Second 
Circuit, where it was heard by a trio of legal legends: Judges Jerome Frank, 
Learned Hand, and Charles Clark. The panel reversed the district court, 
asserting that there were two parts to every infringement analysis—(1) 
whether the defendant copied from the protected work (i.e., “copying in 
fact”) and (2) whether such copying constituted “improper appropriation”—
and both were questions of fact that needed to proceed to trial if there was 
“the slightest doubt.”45 Writing for the majority, Judge Frank considered it 
still to be an open question as to whether Porter could have copied 
Arnstein’s work, even if some of Arnstein’s allegations rang fantastic. Frank 
also explained that the issue of improper appropriation (what we now call 
“substantial similarity”) could not be disposed of as neatly as the district 
court wished. A jury or judge must decide this issue from the vantage point 
of an “ordinary lay hearer,” something that had not been done at the trial 
court level. 46  Frank even suggested that a jury—so long as “tone-deaf 
persons” were excluded from it—would be better at this task than out-of-
touch judges unfamiliar with popular music and that, in the event of a bench 
 
41. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); see, e.g., Oren Bracha, Not De Minimis: (Improper) 
Appropriation in Copyright, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 139, 173–74 (2018). 
42. Arnstein harvested seeds that had been planted by other courts. As explained in a 1926 case, 
“copying which is infringement must be something ‘which ordinary observations would cause to be 
recognized as having been taken from’ the work of another.” Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d 
Cir. 1926) (quoting King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924)). 
43. Balganesh, supra note 4, at 801. 
44. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467. 
45. Id. at 468. 
46. Id. 












trial, a judge trying such a case should solicit the input of an advisory jury.47 
Before Arnstein, being able to filter out unprotectable elements from 
consideration was considered more important to evaluating substantial 
similarity than conveying the audience’s overall reaction to the work. The 
Sheldon judge asserted the superiority of his “Olympian” perspective over 
what the plaintiff’s attorney urged, which was to consider “the impression 
of the Play and the Picture on the ‘average playgoer’” in a way analogous 
to “the ‘reasonable man’ in other branches of the law.” 48  The judge 
explained that because both works were based on the same public-domain 
element—a mid-nineteenth century trial—it made more sense to decide the 
case based on an objective, legally adept perspective that could filter out 
uncopyrightable similarities.49 After Arnstein, priorities flipped: it was now 
considered more important to identify the impressions of the target audience 
than to worry about the risk that those impressions might rely on 
unprotectable ideas or expressive material from the public domain.50 
Now every federal court evaluates substantial similarity from the 
perspective of a lay audience.51 Even when a judge decides the issue of 
improper appropriation, she is meant to do so through the lens of the 
audience for the work. Arnstein’s push to make the infringement analysis 
revolve around audience impressions had two primary consequences. 
First, expert witnesses could not be used to inform an infringement 
analysis dependent on the perceptions of laypersons. If the intended 
audience for a work is one with an ordinary eye and ordinary ear for 
literature, music, or art, then the opinions of experts with extraordinary 
artistic sensibilities arguably offer no insight and might even bias a trier of 
fact trying to guess the reactions of that audience. As a result, courts since 
Arnstein have largely blocked expert testimony on the question of 
substantial similarity. 52  In some jurisdictions, there is an outright 
 
47. Id. at 473 & n.22. 
48. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 7 F. Supp. 837, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). 
49. Id. 
50. Daniel Su, Note, Substantial Similarity and Architectural Works: Filtering Out “Total 
Concept and Feel”, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1851, 1875 (2007) (criticizing an infringement standard that 
asks the ordinary observer to evaluate the “total concept and feel” of two architectural designs in their 
entirety, thereby protecting what should be unprotectable features like “functionally determined and 
standard design elements”). 
51. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.03[E][3][d]; see, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v. 
Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985). An important authority on copyright law maintains 
the audience test has never been recognized by the Supreme Court and that the linking of infringement 
with audience reaction may even clash with the Court’s limited copyright precedent. 4 NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.03[E][1][b]. This argument has yet to find any traction in the lower 
courts. 













prohibition on expert assistance in the substantial similarity analysis.53 
Second, once the perspective of the ordinary observer became 
paramount, copyright infringement claims could rarely be disposed of 
before trial. After all, if the infringement analysis depended on an 
assessment of what “is recognizable by an ordinary observer,”54 then it 
would seem inappropriate for the judge to substitute her opinion on 
infringement for that of the lay juror. Recognizing the new paradigm, 
appellate judges warned district judges away from granting summary 
judgment on the basis of their own comparison of the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s works. As one early Second Circuit opinion chastised, judges 
who award summary judgment to defendants “when upon a reading of the 
two works it seems unlikely from their relative merits that the common 
matter could have been borrowed . . . deprive the plaintiff of his day in 
court.”55 Summary judgment on the issue of substantial similarity continues 
to be disfavored. 56  As explained by the Ninth Circuit, “subjective 
comparisons of literary works that are objectively similar in their expression 
of ideas must be left to the trier of fact.”57 
A final critical point is that the substantial similarity analysis is premised 
on the assumption that different audiences will react to creative works in the 
same way. The Arnstein decision holds that triers of fact need to experience 
the works at issue subjectively, without the intrusion of expert testimony or 
instructions to dissect and compare the works’ individual components. Yet 
the decision also assumes that this subjective process will lead to common 
conclusions instead of each juror coming up with their own idiosyncratic 
analysis. 58  Otherwise, jurors should be precluded from determining 
substantial similarity. One might worry that one audience member’s 
reaction is likely to differ from another, causing infringement decisions to 
vary based on the personal predilections of individual judges and jurors, 
particularly when these decisions are not kept in check through judicial or 
expert guidance. Instead, it is assumed that the trier of fact can uncover the 
aesthetic essence bound up in a creative work in a way that translates across 
audiences and does not require specialized training. 
 
53. Lemley, supra note 2, at 723. 
54. Fleischer Studios v. Ralph A. Fruendlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934). 
55. MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F.2d 696, 701 (2d Cir. 1944). 
56. E.g., Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490 (6th Cir. 2009); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 
1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984). 
57. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by 
Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 942 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). 
58. See Balganesh, supra note 4, at 856 (positing deference to the jury on the issue of substantial 
similarity “derive[s] from the idea that collective decisionmaking and deliberation are likely to iron out 
any individual biases and idiosyncratic biases that an individual decisionmaker (e.g., a judge) might 
have”). 












Reflecting this belief in a largely universal aesthetic experience, courts 
rarely consider the views of a particular audience. Most decisions fall back 
on the presumption that “the response of the ordinary reasonable person” 
will serve as an adequate stand-in for the target audience.59 Jury instructions 
vary between asking jurors to determine whether an “ordinary reasonable 
person” would find the works substantially similar to equating the concept 
of the ordinary reasonable observer with the jurors themselves. 60  The 
implication seems to be that jurors are a sufficient proxy for the audience 
because they will have the same ultimate response to the two works as that 
audience. “In most cases, when a copyrighted work will be directed at the 
public in general, the court need only apply a general public formulation to 
the intended audience test.”61 
In “exceptional circumstances,” courts adjust the substantial similarity 
analysis to consider the views of a particular audience.62 For example, in a 
case involving the alleged infringement of characters from a puppet show, 
the court explained that it had to confront “the particular factual issue of the 
impact of the respective works upon the minds and imaginations of young 
people.” 63  Even when departing from the presumption of audience 
universality, however, courts do little to investigate the particular 
understandings of a specialized audience. The most frequent deviation from 
considering infringement from a generalized perspective is when the works 
at issue are designed to appeal to children. In these cases, only the relative 
inability of these observers to detect disparities is emphasized.64 More fine-
grained explorations of target audience sensibilities are rare,65 testifying to 
the assumption that, in general, different audiences experience creative 
works in the same way.66 
 
59. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1358; see also Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(“This Court’s ‘ear’ is as lay as they come.”) (quoting opinion below). 
60. Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1335 (2012). 
61. Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Well-
Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int’l Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 147, 161–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that 
a “specialized intended audience” test “has not taken root in the Second Circuit”). 
62. Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 491 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that adopting the 
perspective of a specialized audience should be reserved for “exceptional circumstances”). 
63. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th 
Cir. 1977), overruled by on other grounds by Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en 
banc). 
64. See, e.g., Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987); Krofft, 562 F.2d 1157; 
Williams v. Crichton, 860 F. Supp. 158, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
65. Audiences with professional or technical expertise occasionally receive specialized 
treatment. E.g., RGIS, LLC v. A.S.T., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-10975, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4226 at *6–7 
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 22. 2008); Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 436 (S.D. W. Va. 
2003). 
66. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, 905 F.2d 731, 735–36 (4th Cir. 1990); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, 













Perhaps because of this belief in aesthetic universality, courts reject 
opportunities to use outside evidence to gain a better understanding of 
audience differences. Surveys of representative audience members are not 
admissible in copyright infringement actions.67 Take, for example, a case 
involving the manufacture of action figures thought to resemble characters 
from the first Star Wars film. An effort to introduce a survey of the 
perceptions of children—the relevant audience for these creative works—
was rebuffed. The court explained that admitting such a survey would set 
the “dangerous precedent of allowing trial by the court to be replaced by 
public opinion poll.”68 Similarly, in a different matter involving a television 
show alleged to infringe the Superman character, the Second Circuit 
blocked consideration of survey evidence out of concern such evidence 
would usurp what should be the trier of fact’s independent role in 
determining substantial similarity.69 
Contrast this state of affairs with the widespread use of outside evidence 
of audience perception in trademark law. Courts have been much more 
transparent about their own difficulties in accurately assessing the minds of 
consumers in trademark cases.70 As a result, the history of trademark law 
reveals a growing acceptance of outside evidence to determine issues of 
likely consumer confusion as well as mark distinctiveness. 71  Survey 
evidence is widely accepted and even required for some of trademark law’s 
legal questions.72 For trademark infringement claims, courts deploy multi-
factor tests to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion from the 
defendant’s activities. All of these tests call for consideration of evidence 
of “actual confusion”—whether in the form of survey evidence or anecdotal 
testimony—and “customer sophistication,” which allows for scrutiny of the 
particularized understandings of the relevant target consuming group.73 In 
sum, there is a much greater willingness to collect empirical information on 
a target audience when it comes to that audience’s processing of brand 
names and symbols than when it comes to an audience’s encounters with 
music and literature.74 
 
67. 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:83 (2018). 
68. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
69. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983). 
70. For example, Judge Richard Posner acknowledged that “judges and jurors have their own 
biases and blind spots” in trying to understand the thought processes of consumers. Kraft Foods Grp. 
Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.). 
71. Bartholomew, supra note 23, at 548–51. 
72. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:14 
(5th ed. 2018) (stating that surveys have become “almost de rigeur in litigation over genericness”). 
73. See, e.g., AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 792–93 (6th Cir. 2004).  
74. See Michael Ferdinand Sitzer, Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for 
 












B. Distinguishing Between Audiences Through Neuroscience 
By characterizing the audience members’ experience of creative works 
as both subjective and universal, the current test for copyright infringement 
matches the view of the most important philosopher of aesthetics: Immanuel 
Kant. Writing in the eighteenth century, Kant referred to aesthetic judgment 
as “the judgment of taste,” and explained that the experience of pleasure 
from art had a necessarily “subjective condition.”75 But Kant also insisted 
on the commonality, or what he described as the “universal validity,” of 
aesthetic encounters. As he explained, “if [someone] proclaims something 
to be beautiful, then he requires the same liking from others; he then judges 
not just for himself but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a 
property of things.”76 Agreeing with this folk intuition about our responses 
to art, Kant maintained that aesthetic judgments are like empirical 
judgments (e.g., there are ten provinces in Canada) in that they claim 
universal validity, although they are different from empirical judgments in 
that they are based on an inner subjective response.77 In accord with Kant, 
copyright’s audience test relies on the assumption that audience members 
respond to creative works in their own way but somehow arrive at common 
conclusions. 
Neuroaesthetic research challenges this assumption. A great deal of this 
research reveals audience difference. For example, brain imaging 
demonstrates differences in how men and women process art and how they 
experience music.78 Imagine a copyright infringement dispute involving a 
 
Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 397–98 (1981) 
(discussing trademark law’s willingness to take a more specific view of relevant audiences whereas 
copyright law fails to distinguish the intended audience for the relevant works from the general public 
or average observer). Part of this difference between copyright and trademark may lie in the difference 
between the accessibility of each regime’s normative goals. There are complexities to both, but 
trademark law is most certainly about reducing the information costs of consumers in the marketplace. 
Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 75 
(2012). Copyright law’s boundaries are more contentious, in part, because the courts have not found an 
acceptable way to measure “aesthetic progress.” Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic 
Progress, and the Making of American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 331–48 (2017). I thank 
Brian Soucek for helping me realize this point. 
75. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT § 9 at 61 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., 1987). 
76. Id. § 7 at 55–56. 
77. Nick Zangwill, Aesthetic Judgment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed. 
2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/aesthetic-judgment/ [https://perma.cc/8WF2-
DGTD]. See also infra Part II. 
78. See Valentina Cazzato, Sonia Mele & Cosimo Urgesi, Gender Differences in the Neural 
Underpinning of Perceiving and Appreciating the Beauty of the Body, 264 BEHAV. BRAIN RES. 188, 
194–95 (2014); Camilo J. Cela-Conde et al., Sex-Related Similarities and Differences in the Neural 
Correlates of Beauty, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3847, 3851 (2009); Magzhan Kairanbay, John See 














work consumed predominantly by one gender. For example, although fan 
fiction is diverse and different works and genres in fan fiction can have 
different readerships, most fan fiction is written by women and its audience 
trends female.79 If women experience fan fiction differently from men, an 
analysis of substantial similarity without attention to this difference risks 
either over- or underpolicing copyright in a discriminatory manner.80 
The current implementation of the audience test assumes not only that 
people will respond to the same works in the same ways but that this 
aesthetic experience stays the same regardless of prior experience with the 
work’s style, genre, or format.81 Neuroscience offers the ability to compare 
the aesthetic responses of audiences with different backgrounds and to 
search for differences in their reactions. Studies reveal cognitive differences 
in the ways experts and non-experts react to creative works.82 Some amount 
of artistic training produces changes in “art-specific organization in the 
cerebellum.” 83  As expertise increases, so does visual exploration of a 
painting’s overall composition, background features, and color contrasts. 
The “art-naïve,” however, spend more time looking at individual figurative 
elements and figures in the painting’s center and foreground.84 A study 
examining the brain activity of architects and non-architects revealed that 
only the architects retrieved information stored in memory when assessing 
the aesthetic appeal of different buildings.85 
 
in 10704 LECTURE NOTES ON COMPUTER SCI. 531, 539–41 (K. Schoeffmann et al. eds., 2018); 
Alexandre N. Tuch, Javier A. Bargas-Avila & Klaus Opwis, Symmetry and Aesthetics in Web Design: 
It’s a Man’s Business, 26 COMPUTERS HUMAN BEHAV. 1831, 1834–35 (2010). 
79. Tabitha Carvan, Fan Fiction is Women’s Work, OVERLAND (June 28, 2018), https://overland. 
org.au/2018/06/fanfiction-is-womens-work/ (“Fanfiction surpasses romance as the most female genre 
of all, with more of its readers and writers identifying as genderqueer (6 per cent) than male (4 per 
cent).”). 
80. Cf. Pamela Kalinowski, The Fairest of Them All: The Creative Interests of Female Fan 
Fiction Writers and the Fair Use Doctrine, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 655, 661–65 (2014) 
(discussing predominantly female appeal of fan fiction as reason for revising copyright fair use). 
81. It is true that relevant expertise may disqualify someone from a copyright infringement jury. 
Presumably a musicologist would be excluded from a case of musical copyright infringement, and an 
art historian would be kept off a jury deciding a claim of infringement over abstract art. Yet leaving 
these unusual situations to the side, the test for copyright infringement assumes that all observers are 
created relatively equal and will come to a shared consensus as they compare their own aesthetic 
experiences. 
82. CHATTERJEE, supra note 19, at 149; Vinoo Alluri, Petri Toiviainen, Iballa Burunat, Marina 
Kliuchko, Peter Vuust & Elvira Brattico, Connectivity Patterns During Music Listening: Evidence for 
Action-Based Processing in Musicians, 38 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 2955 (2017). 
83. Juan García-Prieto, Ernesto Pereda & Fernando Maestú, Neurocognitive Decoding of 
Aesthetic Appreciation, in MULTIMODAL OSCILLATION-BASED CONNECTIVITY THEORY 87, 97 (S. Palva 
ed. 2016). 
84. Anjan Chatterjee & Oshin Vartanian, Neuroscience of Aesthetics, 1369 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. 
SCI. 172 (2016). 
85. Ulrich Kirk, Martin Skov, Mark Schram Christensen & Niels Nygaard, Brain Correlates of 
Aesthetic Expertise: A Parametric fMRI Study, 69 BRAIN & COGNITION 306, 310 (2009). 












The research shows that familiarity inevitably influences perception.86 
Experience triggers more attention to technique and style when rendering 
an aesthetic judgment; lack of experience prompts greater reliance on 
personal feelings. 87  Audiences differ wildly in their familiarity with 
different art forms. For example, there is a wide disparity among the general 
population in terms of musical experience. This means that one jury or judge 
will likely have significantly different aesthetic responses from another.88 It 
is not that some audience members are comfortable evaluating creative 
works and others are not. Everyone makes aesthetic judgments, even if they 
lack training or familiarity with the category of work at issue. It is just that 
the means and content of these judgments differ based on who is making 
the judgment and their background relationship to the work.89 
Regardless of audience familiarity, the process of aesthetic judgment 
changes depending on the mode of artistic expression. The substantial 
similarity analysis remains the same regardless of the kind of creative work 
at issue or the particular senses employed to appreciate that art. It is true that 
courts display a somewhat greater comfort with literary works and, as a 
result, are particularly loath to allow dissection and expert testimony in 
those cases. 90  But this is by no means an established rule. In general, 
copyright law does not adjust to note differences in creative formats. The 
dominant assumption in copyright law is that aesthetic judgment operates 
in the same fashion in one artistic context as it does in another.91 
In reality, the character of our aesthetic understanding changes 
 
86. Adam L. Alter & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a 
Metacognitive Nation, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 219, 228 (2009). 
87. Helmut Leder, Next Steps in Neuroaesthetics: Which Processes and Processing Stages to 
Study?, 7 J. PSYCH. AESTHETICS, CREATIVITY & ARTS 27, 33 (2013). 
88. Valorie N. Salimpoor, David H. Zald, Robert J. Zatorre, Alain Dagher & Anthony Randal 
McIntosh, Predictions and the Brain: How Musical Sounds Become Rewarding, 19 TRENDS COGNITIVE 
SCI. 86, 89 (2015); see also KEVIN J. MITCHELL, INNATE: HOW THE WIRING OF OUR BRAINS SHAPES 
WHO WE ARE 142–43 (2018) (discussing differences in perceptual abilities in the general population, 
including the three percent of the population that is tone deaf). 
89. Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz, Toward an Integrative Approach of Cognitive 
Neuroscientific and Evolutionary Psychological Studies of Art, 8 EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 695, 696 
(2010). 
90. This comfort has consequences. In contrast to other kinds of copyright disputes, no plaintiff 
in a copyright infringement case involving a literary work has won at trial in the last twenty-five years. 
Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright 3: The Awakening, 41 L.A. LAW. 28, 28, 30 n.9 (2018). By contrast, 
the success rate is greater for copyright suits involving musical compositions where courts are more 
accepting of expert testimony. See Regina Zernay, Comment, Casting the First Stone: The Future of 
Music Copyright Law After Blurred Lines, Stay With Me, and Uptown Funk, 20 CHAPMAN L. REV. 177, 
209–11 (2017) (describing use of experts in music copyright infringement cases as “not uncommon” 
and recounting commentary attributing the jury verdict finding infringement in a lawsuit over the song 
“Blurred Lines” to testimony from plaintiff’s expert musicologists). 
91. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 684 (“Copyright is literal. It starts with the written word as its 













depending on the kind of creative work presented. Abstract art prompts 
more varied aesthetic reactions than representational art.92 Dance expertise 
and architectural knowledge exhibit their own unique biologies.93 Perhaps 
most significantly, our biological responses to visual works differ from our 
responses to aural ones.94  For example, there is evidence that listeners 
perceive music in a dissective manner as they analyze various individual 
features of a song rather than evaluating the song holistically. By contrast, 
evaluation of other creative works involves a more gestalt-like analysis.95 
This difference between the aesthetic processing of visual and aural works 
has direct implications for music infringement cases. Often such cases 
depend on a judge’s choice to believe that the relevant audience will either 
consider a song in its entirety or focus its attention on a particular measure 
in the work’s chorus.96 
Some might question whether neuroscientific research, which, by 
necessity, is conducted with small sample sizes, can offer generalizable 
insights into audience reaction. The answer is that, in a variety of contexts, 
small sample sizes for neuroscientific studies supply results that apply to 
larger, legally relevant populations.97 Although there is variability, “studies 
of aesthetic preference are reasonably consistent in their findings.”98 Instead 
of being hopelessly different, aesthetic reactions in particular audiences 
appear to have enough coherence that information about these reactions can 
help inform the audience test. Neuroaesthetic studies provide probative 
evidence of commonalities among various cohorts, including women, 
 
92. Edward A. Vessel, Natalia Maurer, Alexander H. Denker & G. Gabrielle Starr, Stronger 
Shared Taste for Natural Aesthetic Domains Than for Artifacts of Human Culture, 179 COGNITION 121, 
122 (2018). 
93. Beatriz Calvo-Merino, Shantel Ehrenberg, Delia Leung & Patrick Haggard, Experts See It 
All: Configural Effects in Action Observation, 74 PSYCHOL. RES. 400 (2010); Kirk et al., supra note 85, 
at 309. 
94. Jon O. Lauring, Visual Art, in AN INTRODUCTION TO NEUROAESTHETICS 115, 125 (Jon O. 
Lauring ed. 2014) (visual beauty triggers activity in the caudate nucleus, but not musical beauty); 
Cristina Rosazza, Qing Cai, Ludovico Minati, Yves Paulignan & Tatjana A. Nazir, Early Involvement 
of Dorsal and Ventral Pathways in Visual Word Recognition: An ERP Study, 1272 BRAIN RES. 32, 32–
33 (2009) (maintaining that there is better understanding of the neural pathways underlying visual object 
recognition than for recognition of spoken or written words). 
95. Isabel Corngold, Note, Copyright Infringement and the Science of Music Memory: Applying 
Cognitive Psychology to the Substantial Similarity Test, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 319, 339–42 (2017); Paul J. 
Locher, The Aesthetic Experience with Visual Art “At First Glance”, in INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE 
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE ONTOLOGY OF THE WORK OF ART: WHAT ARE ARTWORKS AND HOW DO 
WE EXPERIENCE THEM 75, 75–77 (Peer F. Bundgaard & Frederik Stjernfelt eds., 2015). 
96. See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2004). 
97. Emily B. Falk, Elliot T. Berkman & Matthew D. Lieberman, From Neural Responses to 
Population Behavior: Neural Focus Group Predicts Population-Level Media Effects, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
439, 444 (2012) (explaining that “behavioral responses of entire populations whose brains are never 
examined may be inferred from the brain activations of a small neural focus group”).  
98. García-Prieto et al., supra note 83, at 98. 












children, and individuals of a particular socioeconomic status.99 
Moreover, in the context of copyright infringement, everyone in a target 
audience need not evaluate an artwork in the same way for such evidence to 
be probative. A finding of substantial similarity relies only on general 
agreement about the audience’s aesthetic experience, not certitude about the 
uniformity of that experience. 100  Neuroaesthetic research demonstrates 
there are enough differences in aesthetic judgment to invalidate copyright 
law’s one-size-fits-all approach to audience reaction while at the same time 
offering evidence of commonalities within particularized audiences.  
Once audience difference is taken seriously, some difficult line-drawing 
may be necessary when it comes to determining who makes up the relevant 
audience for a work. Mistakes might be made, resulting in either over- or 
underinclusion. But even the occasional misstep in selecting an audience 
represents an improvement over the status quo, where audience differences 
are ignored entirely. As I suggest in Part III, courts should embrace the 
neuroscientific understanding of audience variability by calibrating the 
substantial similarity analysis to the intended audience for the plaintiff’s 
work instead of assuming that any onlooker would process the creative work 
at issue in the same fashion.101 
In sum, neuroaesthetics challenges copyright’s assumption that most 
audiences think alike. Recent findings reveal great variability in aesthetic 
response, which has potential consequences for construction of the 
substantial similarity analysis. Merely distinguishing between experts and 
non-experts does not capture the full scope of audience heterogeneity. 
Rather than being in general agreement, different audience members, even 
if they are not experts, process artistic works in different ways. Moreover, 
if the audience test is to be informed by current neuroscientific 
understandings, the test will need to be able to adapt to different modalities 
in creative expression. Neuroscience demonstrates that not all audiences are 
the same and that the mechanics of aesthetic judgment differ across kinds 
of art. Unfortunately, copyright law offers no guidance to a trier of fact 
striving to understand audience difference. The substantial similarity 
analysis vigorously resists outside evidence whether in the form of 
 
99. See generally Cazzato et al., supra note 78; Jason Chien, Dustin Albert, Lia O’Brien, Kaitlyn 
Uckert & Laurence Steinberg, Peers Increase Adolescent Risk by Enhancing Activity in the Brain’s 
Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 1 (2011); Martha J. Farah, The Neuroscience of 
Socioeconomic Status: Correlates, Causes, and Consequences, 96 NEURON 56 (2017). 
100. Cf. Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 454 (2017) (maintaining 
that one can reject the argument that aesthetic preference is so relative that judges may never make 
aesthetic decisions while still not requiring that “everyone converge on one single, universally agreed-
upon interpretation and evaluation of every artwork”). 













testimony from an expert in the field or surveys of relevant audience 
members. 
II. UNDERSTANDING AESTHETICS 
In 2009, Tashera Simmons came up with an idea for a reality show called 
“Hip Hop Wives.”102 Simmons was married to the rapper DMX, but a string 
of arrests and extra-marital affairs took their toll on the relationship, and the 
pair ultimately divorced.103 Simmons envisioned a show about the trials and 
tribulations of women, including herself, in relationships with hip hop 
artists. She pitched the idea to the television network VH1. VH1 passed, but 
two years later began airing a reality show called “Love & Hip Hop” 
focused on the personal and professional lives of women in the hip hop 
industry.104 The show grew into a major media franchise with over four 
hundred episodes airing to generally high ratings.105  
There were a number of similarities between the “Hip Hop Wives” 
proposal and the first season of “Love & Hip Hop.” Both shows centered 
on the troubled personal relationships of women attached in some form to 
the hip hop industry. Both featured Chrissy Lampkin, partner of the hip hop 
artist Jim Jones. Both shows were described as having a “fast” and “high 
octane” pace. Nevertheless, a district court concluded that “no reasonable 
jury could conclude that the two works are substantially similar.”106 
Three years earlier, the same court needed to decide another copyright 
infringement suit involving reality television. This time, the plaintiff 
managed to convince the court that a jury could find the two works 
substantially similar. The plaintiff proposed a reality show that pitted 
celebrity contestants against one another in events designed to mimic the 
training for Navy Seals. A producer affiliated with NBCUniversal 
responded favorably to the plaintiff’s pitch, but then declined. Shortly 
thereafter, NBC aired a show called “Stars Earn Stripes” that revolved 
around celebrity contestants competing in skill-based competitions based on 
military maneuvers. In the court’s view, both shows demonstrated a similar 
theme and mood (“appreciation and respect for military personnel”) and 
 
102. 8th Wonder Entm’t v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-01748-DDP-JCG, 2016 WL 6882832, 
at *1–3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2016). 
103. Charli Penn, Tashera Simmons: Why I’m Really Divorcing DMX, ESSENCE (June 12, 2012), 
https://www.essence.com/news/tashera-simmons-why-im-really-done-with-dmx/ [https://perma.cc/M4 
XY-L2FW]. 
104. 8th Wonder Entm’t, 2016 WL 6882832 at *1–3. 
105. Love & Hip Hop, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Love_%26_Hip_Hop [https://pe 
rma.cc/4SFW-4JX4]. 
106. 8th Wonder Entm’t, 2016 WL 6882831 at *7–8. 












“uncannily similar” kinds of contestants (e.g., WWE professional wrestlers, 
former Dancing with the Stars competitors).107 Unlike in the case of Ms. 
Simmons, the court concluded that when “[v]iewing the protectable 
elements of the works as a whole,” a reasonable trier of fact could determine 
the two works to be substantially similar.108  
Some critics blame Arnstein’s call to interpret infringement through 
audience sensibilities for the inconsistent and unpredictable state of 
copyright infringement doctrine.109 As discussed in Part I, neuroscience 
indicates that the audience test does a bad job of addressing variations in 
audiences and their judgment of creative works. Yet even though Arnstein 
identified who was relevant for determining infringement, the decision did 
not specify what its audience test was supposed to measure. A judge or jury 
examining two works for substantial similarity needs to know what level of 
similarity should be considered “substantial.” Other decisions supplied this 
information, instructing that the task for the trier of fact was to determine if 
the “aesthetic appeal” of the defendant’s work is the “same” as the 
plaintiff’s work.110 At the same time, “aesthetic appeal” is not a term with a 
clear legal or philosophical definition.111 Maybe two reality shows featuring 
celebrities enduring military training had the same aesthetic appeal whereas 
programs showcasing the personal lives of women in hip hop did not, but it 
is hard to know why. Somehow the moods and themes in the first case were 
insufficiently similar but not in the second. The shared use of comparable 
kinds of celebrity contestants was probative of aesthetic similarity for the 
military reality show, but featuring the same cast member in both hip hop 
shows—Chrissy Lampkin—was not. By tethering infringement to aesthetic 
experience, copyright law makes the infringement analysis highly uncertain 
and often inconsistent.112 
This is not to say that there are no guideposts for determining a work’s 
 
107. Dillon v. NBCUniversal Media, 2013 WL 3581938, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2013). 
108. Id. at *7. 
109. Balganesh, supra note 4, at 859 (tying lack of guidelines for infringement analysis to the 
audience test’s “anti-intellectual (i.e., intuitive) nature”); Lemley, supra note 2, at 719 (stating that 
Arnstein “has the analysis of proof exactly backwards”). 
110. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
111. See Robert Kirk Walker & Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright 
Law: A Community of Practice Standard, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 374–76 (2015) (suggesting different 
ways to approach aesthetic judgments, and advocating for rendering such judgments from the 
perspective of a hypothetical “Community of Practice” that can inform courts as to “the aesthetic norms 
and traditions that influenced the works”). 
112. My point here is not that both cases should have had the same outcome. Strong arguments 
can be made for why common elements in the “Hip Hop Wives” case were unprotectable ideas or already 
in the public domain whereas the similarities in the “Stars Earn Stripes” case involved protectable 
expression. These distinctions are not clear, however, nor is it clear how the courts should identify which 













aesthetic appeal. Over the years, in attempting to define the parameters of 
the aesthetic experience, courts have made certain assumptions. Aesthetic 
experience is considered subjective and unmeasurable, making a 
quantitative analysis impossible. Any effort to empirically determine the 
features of copyrighted works that audiences would pay the most attention 
to or that would rank highest in their aesthetic evaluations is doomed to fail 
and therefore must be excluded from the substantial similarity analysis. 
Moreover, the belief that responses to art occur rapidly makes judges 
skeptical of lengthy deliberations over work similarities. As we will see, 
neuroaesthetic studies challenge some of these assumptions about the 
aesthetic experience, placing the foundation of substantial similarity on 
unstable ground.  
A. Moving from Empirical Investigation to Unquantifiable Intuition 
Courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries posited certain 
qualities to the aesthetic experience. They maintained that pleasure was at 
the heart of aesthetic response and this response was unavoidably 
subjective, preventing its discernment through objective criteria. They also 
believed that one appreciates art spontaneously, not through lengthy 
analysis. These assumptions, despite a complete lack of empirical support 
at the time they were made, remain embedded in the law of substantial 
similarity today.  
1. Daly v. Palmer and the Turn to Aesthetic Experience 
By stressing aesthetic concerns, the substantial similarity test leaves out 
other potential commonalities that could inform the infringement analysis. 
One might envision a substantial similarity test that asked the jury in the 
Led Zeppelin case to tally up what matches and what does not in a measure-
by-measure analysis of the two musical works, perhaps with the court first 
screening out those aspects of Randy Wolfe’s song that are not 
copyrightable. 113  Instead, the jury was told to make a “subjective 
comparison” of Led Zeppelin and Wolfe’s works and evaluate their “total 
concept and feel,” thereby foreclosing this kind of defined, detailed 
comparison of song similarities and differences. 114  A comparison of 
aesthetic appeal means that raw similarity, by itself, is not enough to 
 
113. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 847–48 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that district court erred 
in “basing its comparison of the two choruses at issue almost entirely on a measure-by-measure 
comparison” for purposes of the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic test for substantial similarity).  
114. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated and rev’d in 
part on other grounds, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). 












establish infringement.115  
Another potential route for the infringement analysis would be to analyze 
the commercial effect of the defendant’s work on the plaintiff’s audience 
instead of its aesthetic effect.116 If market harm was the sine qua non of 
infringement, the substantial similarity test would look much different.117 If 
proof that the defendant’s work serves as an economic substitute for the 
plaintiff’s work was required to find infringement, Tashera Simmons’ case 
might have hinged on an assessment of whether VH1’s “Love & Hip Hop” 
empire hurt the potential market for “Hip Hop Wives.” Copyright law has 
not chosen this path either. The audience test rejects direct consideration of 
perceived similarities or financial harm, instead defining infringement on 
the unknowable aesthetic sensibilities of the trier of fact.118 
The critical precedent that eventually led to aesthetic appeal becoming 
the sine qua non of infringement was Daly v. Palmer.119 That case, decided 
seventy-five years before Arnstein, signaled a move from defining 
infringement as bodily appropriation of copyrighted expression to 
something broader and ineffable. Beginning with Daly, in the mid to late 
nineteenth century, “[t]he infringement analysis slowly shifted from having 
a strong focus on verbatim copying to encompassing increasingly remote 
 
115. Raw similarity is relevant to the copying in fact analysis. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64 (1991) (holding that while copying as a factual matter was shown, 
copying as a legal proposition had not been established because the copied information was merely raw 
data that did not “owe its origin” to the plaintiff). 
116. Charles E. Colman, Design and Deviance: Patent as Symbol, Rhetoric As Metric Part 2, 56 
JURIMETRICS 1, 10 (2015). 
117. See Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of 
Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 732 (1987) (“Instead of using some objective 
standards or criteria based on economic impact or quantity, courts [are] to determine infringement on an 
unpredictable, impressionistic basis.”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in 
Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 251–55 (2012) (maintaining that the substantial similarity analysis is 
structured so as to take into account non-utilitarian values). 
118. Analysis of market harm has largely been outsourced to copyright’s fair use analysis. 
According to the Supreme Court, a defendant making a successful fair use defense must show that his 
copying “does not materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied.” Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567 (1985). Rather than guessing at audience response, 
courts determine market harm by examining evidence regarding purchasers of the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s works, concluding that market harm is unlikely when these two groups of purchasers do not 
overlap. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013). Although arguments about harm to 
future markets for derivatives of the original are considered in fair use, courts evaluating the defense 
reject such arguments when they are speculative or lack empirical grounding. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). Admittedly, determining when a market might 
exist in the future is inherently difficult and can potentially depend on the fair use determination itself. 
See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–31 (2d Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the fair 
use doctrine’s insistence that fair use only be determined based on the presence of “a workable market” 
indicates a level of objective inquiry that is not present in the current substantial similarity analysis. 
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1276 (11th Cir. 2014); see also infra Part III.A.2. 













levels of similarity.”120  
Playwright Augustin Daly wrote a melodrama with a sensationalist scene 
featuring a character tied to a railroad track by a villain; the character was 
then rescued from a steaming locomotive by the play’s protagonist in the 
nick of time. When a theatre owner staged another play with a similar 
railroad scene, Daly sued for copyright infringement.121 A federal court in 
New York found in Daly’s favor explaining:  
it is a piracy, if the appropriated series of events, when represented 
on the stage, although performed by new and different characters, 
using different language, is recognized by the spectator, through any 
of the senses to which the representation is addressed, as conveying 
substantially the same impressions to, and exciting the same 
emotions in, the mind, in the same sequence or order.122 
For decades, courts had assessed whether infringement occurred by looking 
to whether the actual language of the original work had been copied by the 
defendant. For example, Harriett Beecher Stowe failed in her infringement 
action against an unauthorized translator of her book Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
because the German translation did not contain the exact same English 
words as the original.123  The Daly decision conceived of the copyright 
interest more broadly, not as a right in the four corners of a tangible object, 
but as a right to prevent others from recreating aspects of a copyrighted work 
in a way that would prompt the same aesthetic experience. Daly began to 
shift substantial similarity away from an empirical investigation of tangible 
qualities to a question that relied on unquantifiable intuition to answer. 
Daly’s vision of aesthetic experience did not lend itself to a rigorous 
picking apart of works. By locating infringement in the registering of 
“impressions” and “emotions,”124 Daly implied that substantial similarity 
could not be determined on the basis of careful study or an exacting 
breakdown of two works into their component parts. As one early twentieth 
century court explained, because “copyright, like all statutes, is made for 
plain people . . . infringement must be something which ordinary 
observations would cause to be recognized”; if “dissection rather than 
observation” is needed “to discern any resemblance,” then there is no 
 
120. Bracha, supra note 41, at 171. 
121. Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1133. 
122. Id. at 1138. 
123. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (“A translation may, 
in loose phraseology, be called a transcript or copy of her thoughts or conceptions, but in no correct 
sense can it be called a copy of her book.”). 
124. Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1137. 












infringement.125  More recently, a federal court of appeals described the 
“touchstone of the [substantial similarity] analysis” as only countenancing 
those differences that the ordinary observer had not “set out to detect.”126  
To protect the impressionistic quality of aesthetic reaction, courts largely 
prohibit attempts to determine substantial similarity by compiling lists of 
similarities and differences in the works at issue.127 Determining aesthetic 
response should not involve a “catalogue,” explained Learned Hand. Instead 
the “proper approach . . . must be more ingenious, more like that of a 
spectator, who would rely upon the complex of his impressions of each 
character.”128 Courts today describe the infringement comparison as one of 
“overall look and feel.” 129  Thanks to the focus on aesthetic response, 
“copyright infringement is supposed to be based on a gestalt reaction,”130 
not an evaluation of “minute differences between the two works.”131  
2. Pleasure and the Inherent Subjectivity of Aesthetic Experience 
In attempting to formulate the central components of aesthetic 
experience, courts highlight audience pleasure. Copyright decisions speak 
of a certain substance in creative works that is pleasurable to the senses and 
can be elucidated without much effort. In a formulation endorsed by several 
federal courts, Arnstein framed the substantial similarity analysis as 
“whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing 
to the ears of lay listeners . . . that defendant wrongfully appropriated 
something which belongs to the plaintiff.”132 Courts can equate that which 
is “pleasing” in the aesthetic experience with beauty, explaining that it is 
the “beautiful” aspects of a work that must be protected from appropriation 
by others.133 Put another way, the trier of fact must assess what the audience 
 
125. Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924)). 
126. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
127. 3 PATRY, supra note 67, at § 9.76; see, e.g., Olson v. Tenney, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1235 
(D. Or. 2006) (expressing skepticism over probative value of plaintiff’s compilation of 185 supposed 
similarities between her work and the defendant’s).  
128. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930). 
129. Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1296; Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 
562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (“total concept and feel”); DuBay v. King, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 
1348 (M.D. Fla. 2019). 
130. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 736. 
131. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); see 
also Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e analyze works as cohesive wholes, 
without distinguishing between protected and unprotected elements, just as the works’ intended 
audiences likely would encounter them in the marketplace.”). 
132. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946); see also, e.g., Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1296.  














would consider of value in the plaintiff’s work and determine if that 
pleasurable essence is replicated in the defendant’s work.134 This linking of 
audience pleasure and aesthetic response takes what might be a logical 
inquiry regarding the tangible material of the plaintiff’s work and 
transforms it into a query that is subjective and resistant to judicial scrutiny.  
For copyright law, the pleasure enjoyed by audiences is inevitably 
subjective and intuitive. Take these comments from the Ninth Circuit on 
how the trier of fact should put herself in the shoes of the average audience 
member. Substantial similarity, the court explained: 
is not a legal conclusion; rather it involves the audience in an 
interactive process with the author of the work in question, and calls 
on us “to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a 
semblance of truth sufficient to procure for those shadows of 
imagination that willing suspension of belief for the moment, which 
constitutes poetic faith.”135 
This “interactive process” between author and audience is unavoidably 
subjective, requiring courts to abandon their penchant for objective 
analysis.136 The panel went on to employ a quote from Hamlet to describe 
this process, stating that “this interactive assessment is by nature an 
individualized one that will provoke a varied response in each juror, for 
what ‘makes the unskillful laugh, cannot but make the judicious grieve.’”137 
In other words, the pleasure experienced by audiences cannot be derived 
through objective calculation. It must be subjectively experienced by the 
 
beauty expressed in the materials of statuary or drawing, is the thing which is copyrighted. That is what 
the infringer copies.”). One might worry that linking the aesthetic experience to beauty would overly 
limit the range of copyrightable materials, with courts reserving protection for only works that fall into 
preconceived categories of classical or fine art. But “beauty” has been defined broadly. See Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (“Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit 
a narrow or rigid concept of art.”). Moreover, although perhaps challenged by relatively recent trends in 
contemporary art, there is widespread agreement that beauty and pleasure are essential components in 
the aesthetic experience. CHATTERJEE, supra note 19, at xx–xxi. One study showed that “beauty” was 
the word most commonly associated with aesthetics. Thomas Jacobsen, Katharina Buchta, Michael 
Köhler & Erich Schröger, The Primacy of Beauty in Judging the Aesthetics of Objects, 94 PSYCH. REP. 
1253, 1253–60 (2004). 
134. The Tenth Circuit defines substantial similarity as “whether the accused work is so similar 
to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully 
appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible [sic] expression by taking material of substance and value.” 
Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996). Courts applying this 
“substance and value” standard have equated it with “aesthetic appeal.” Blehm v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d 1193, 
1202 (10th Cir. 2012).  
135. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting S.T. Coleridge, Biographia 
Literaria, ch. 14, reprinted in 5 ENGLISH LITERATURE: THE ROMANTIC PERIOD (A. Reed ed., 1929)), 
overruled on other grounds by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). 
136. See id. 
137. Id. (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2). 












trier of fact in the way that the audience itself experienced it or would 
experience it.138 
Hence, courts rely on “intuitive sense” to assess a work’s aesthetic 
appeal rather than reasoned evaluation or guidance from experts in the 
field.139 Zahr Said describes copyright’s conception of aesthetic reading as 
“subjective in the nonlegal sense of intuitive, impressionistic[,] and gestalt 
as opposed to analytic and dissective.” 140  Instinct is what matters for 
measuring aesthetic response, not reasoned deliberation. Dissenting in 
Arnstein, Judge Clark contended that “[m]usic is a matter of the intellect as 
well as the emotions; that is why eminent musical scholars insist upon the 
employment of the intellectual faculties for a just appreciation of music.”141 
Yet the majority took a different path, now followed by all other federal 
courts, that asks for the immediate reactions of the trier of fact, unaided by 
scholarly expertise, to diagnose the actionable essence of creative works.142 
The downside to characterizing aesthetic response as inherently 
subjective is that it makes that response impossible to pin down, leaving 
copyright litigants on uncertain terrain and the trier of fact reliant on instinct 
to decide the ultimate issue of infringement. Courts acknowledge this 
demerit without really coming up with any workable corrective. Responding 
to criticism that its test for substantial similarity was too vague, the Second 
Circuit somewhat feebly responded that the trier of fact must “identify 
precisely the particular aesthetic decisions—original to the plaintiff and 
copied by the defendant—that might be thought to make the designs similar 
in the aggregate.”143 Yet the court offered no guidance for determining how 
to make this precise identification of what the audience might think similar. 
Outsiders cannot help with this identification. Because aesthetic judgment 
is an intuitive process not a deliberative one, the trier of fact must rely on 
 
138. A good example comes from Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2015) where the 
court tried to recreate how “the general public typically encounters popular music” by listening to the 
songs at issue “from start to finish” as “lay listeners,” but seemingly not repeating them over and over. 
Id. at 491–92. 
139. Walker & Depoorter, supra note 111, at 374. 
140. Zahr K. Said, A Transactional Theory of the Reader in Copyright Law, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
605, 619 (2017). 
141. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 476 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
142. Even after the decision, Judge Clark continued to think that Arnstein’s privileging of 
“average” aesthetics over objective expertise was wrongheaded:  
[T]he issue is no longer one of musical similarity or identity to justify the conclusion of 
copying—a[n] issue to be decided with all the intelligence, musical as well as legal we can 
bring to bear upon it—but is one, first, of copying, to be decided more or less intelligently, and, 
second, of illicit copying, to be decided blindly on a mere cacophony of sounds. 
Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 491 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment). 
143. Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 













her sensibilities alone and “detect piracy ‘without any aid or suggestions or 
critical analysis by others.’”144  
An important Ninth Circuit decision, Shaw v. Lindheim, 145  openly 
recognizes the predictive difficulties spawned by copyright law’s focus on 
aesthetic reaction. Shaw affirmed that substantial similarity in that 
jurisdiction requires satisfaction of both an “extrinsic test” and an “intrinsic 
test.” The extrinsic test allows an analysis of similarities according to 
objective criteria and a filtering out of unprotectable elements. If the 
plaintiff satisfies the extrinsic test, the trier of fact must then evaluate 
infringement under the intrinsic test. The intrinsic test, far different from the 
extrinsic test, is based on the “total concept and feel” of the work to “the 
ordinary, reasonable person.” 146  It allows the unprotectable elements 
filtered out during the extrinsic analysis to flood back in for comparison. It 
is also extremely vague, making it exceedingly difficult for courts to 
evaluate and overturn problematic infringement rulings.147 The Shaw court 
acknowledged that “a judicial determination under the intrinsic test is now 
virtually devoid of analysis, for the intrinsic test has become a mere 
subjective judgment as to whether two literary works are or are not 
similar.”148 It went on to note that courts often supply no more than a single 
paragraph of analysis to justify their determination under the intrinsic 
similarity determination.149  
These may sound like criticisms, but the Shaw court did not call for 
changing the intrinsic test. It was comfortable, or at least accepting, of the 
test’s unanalytic, unreviewable conception of aesthetic response. Shaw only 
requires that the intrinsic analysis be conducted by the trier of fact, making 
summary judgment impossible once the defendant clears the hurdle of the 
 
144. Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Harold 
Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933)). 
145. 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Skidmore v. Led 
Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020). 
146. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018). The Ninth Circuit’s intrinsic test has 
been described as operating in the same fashion and serving the same purpose as the traditional ordinary 
observer test. Said, supra note 140, at 611. 
147. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1830–32 (contending that, by making the defendant’s capture 
of the “total concept and feel” of the plaintiff’s work the core inquiry of the intrinsic test, courts have 
made “it too easy for unprotectable elements to be swept into the infringement analysis”).  
148. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357 (citing Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) and 
Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988)). Judicial insistence that the audience’s 
experience with the works at issue is subjective and therefore undefinable may be viewed not just as a 
belief about the reality of art appreciation, but also a ploy to avoid decisionmaking in this area. Christine 
Haight Farley traces a pervasive judicial reluctance to engage with aesthetic questions in the law 
generally. “Art is assumed to be the quintessence of the subjective,” says Farley, and “[s]ubjectivity 
makes judges uncomfortable.” Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 856 (2005). 
149. See Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988) (reaching a result under 
the intrinsic test in one paragraph); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) (same). 














Another component of aesthetic appeal involves its temporal scope. 
Courts have suggested a time limit for judges and juries attempting to 
discern the aesthetic response of ordinary observers and listeners. The 
probable response by the ordinary observer after labored scrutiny of the 
works at issue is not what the analysis asks for. Instead, the analysis asks 
for only the “spontaneous and immediate” experience of audiences.151 The 
“visceral reactions” of the observer are what determine infringement.152 
Courts sometimes refer to the “ordinary observer” as the “casual observer,” 
implying that a speedy, non-deliberative processing of the works at issue is 
the appropriate means for calculating substantial similarity.153 
As a result, rapid responses to creative works have more validity for the 
infringement analysis than ones drawn out over time. Aesthetic experience 
should be immediate: “There is a notion that juries ought to be able to look 
at works and experience a gut reaction.”154  Unless the work at issue is 
particularly complex or technical, the work is “seen to speak for itself,” 
obviating the need for lengthy scrutiny.155 Even comparisons that may be 
relatively challenging because the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s work 
are in different media are evaluated for their instantaneous impression. For 
example, a court assessing whether a book and a movie were substantially 
similar explained that it compared the two works “to determine a lay 
observer’s immediate response.”156 In this view, the rapidity of aesthetic 
judgment makes it more reliable in diagnosing improper copying, not less.  
This call for immediate impressions rather than careful comparison 
vexes some opponents of the ordinary observer test. “Why should the 
ordinary observer be expected to detect spontaneously and immediately the 
theft which probably took weeks and months to disguise?,” queried one 
 
150. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1361. 
151. Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harold Lloyd Corp. v. 
Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933)). See also Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 51 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (noting that the Second Circuit generally judges substantial similarity “by the spontaneous 
response of the ordinary lay observer”). 
152. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at §13.03[E][2]. 
153. E.g., United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
154. Said, supra note 140, at 639. 
155. Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 502 n.232 
(2015). 













exasperated law professor. 157  The answer is that substantial similarity 
investigates aesthetic encounters, which courts believe to be instantaneous 
phenomena. Many other areas of the law require the trier of fact to intuit the 
behavior of outsiders. Tort law famously asks whether the defendant’s 
conduct matches the conduct of the “reasonable person.” Yet, because 
copyright law asks the trier of fact to intuit the reasonable person’s aesthetic 
response, courts stress that there is no time for the reasonable person to 
engage in lengthy deliberation or analysis. 
By defining aesthetic response as something immediate, courts supply 
another reason—in addition to the assumption that aesthetic responses are 
universal—to exclude experts from the substantial similarity analysis.158 
Expertise would seem to have little place in describing a phenomenon that 
operates so instinctually. At times, courts explicitly bifurcate the non-
aesthetic properties of a creative work, which they believe can benefit from 
articulation by an expert, from its aesthetic properties, which they believe 
cannot. Expert testimony is allowed in copyright cases involving computer 
software because software typically reflects more of an emphasis on 
functional properties than aesthetic ones. 159  By contrast, there is a 
“traditional role of lay observers in judging substantial similarity in 
copyright cases that involve the aesthetic arts, such as music, visual works 
or literature.”160 In one case, a court diagnosed “structural” similarities and 
“aesthetic” similarities in two gazebos.161 Expert testimony was not allowed 
regarding the gazebos’ aesthetic elements, but “because structural and 
engineering elements are not necessarily within the jury’s knowledge, 
expert testimony as to these matters may assist the jury.”162 According to 
the law of copyright infringement, non-aesthetic components of creative 
works are susceptible to reasoned deliberation; aesthetic components are 
not. 
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B. The Science of How Aesthetic Decisions Are Made 
Neuroscientists are becoming more and more adept at quantifying 
different components of aesthetic judgment, a mental process that copyright 
law insists is impossible to measure. By no means do these neural 
recordings reflect a complete or invariably accurate picture of our 
experiences with creative works. But they do offer empirical information 
for a process that legal actors have long complained was in need of just such 
information. At the same time, brain research confirms the courts’ temporal 
assessment of aesthetic experience. Our reactions to creative works occur 
automatically and are rarely shaken from this initial estimate.  
1. Searching for Objective Measures 
As neuroaesthetic studies continue to reveal more specifics about 
aesthetic choice, copyright law’s longstanding insistence that aesthetic 
choice cannot be interrogated may weaken. Researchers claim to be able to 
distinguish the hallmarks of aesthetic experience from functional 
experiences.163 Neuroscientists identify a “fundamentally different pattern 
of neurophysiological activation” for artworks audience members perceive 
as “best in terms of aesthetic quality” 164  or “the most aesthetically 
moving.” 165  Scientists are also getting better at separating aesthetic 
judgment into its component parts. The neural evidence of an audience’s 
processing of an artwork’s pictorial content can be distinguished from 
evidence of the audience’s processing of the artist’s style.166  
Neuroscientific study of human reactions to music provides a good 
example of how brain science can contribute to our understanding of 
aesthetic encounters. “Aesthetic listening” experiments purport to offer a 
“traceable” mental process for the perception, understanding, and 
enjoyment of musical events.167 These experiments reveal the significance 
of particular portions of musical works to the listener. Tell-tale neural 
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signals distinguish between sounds serving as a real stimulus that can 
contribute to the aesthetic experience from sounds that the listener will only 
consider noise.168 
Perhaps most relevant to the substantial similarity calculation, 
neuroaesthetics investigates which aspects of artistic work are most salient 
to audiences.169  Understandably, substantial similarity doctrine asks the 
trier of fact to render a judgment as to aesthetic salience. For example, when 
an R&B songwriter accused Usher and Justin Bieber of wrongfully 
appropriating his musical work, the Fourth Circuit reversed a substantial 
similarity determination in the defendants’ favor.170 It faulted the trial court 
for ignoring the importance of the choruses to both songs and applying a 
“purely quantitative inquiry” to the question of “aesthetic appeal.” 171 
Because choruses are the part of a song “that many listeners will recognize 
immediately or hear in their minds when a song title is mentioned,” the 
appellate judges deemed chorus similarities “disproportionately 
significant.”172 
This makes sense. If one is concerned with protecting the creative 
incentives of authors, it is appropriate to use copyright law to protect the 
original aspects of a work that are most noticeable or important to audiences. 
The problem is that the Fourth Circuit relied on a hunch about audience 
reaction to the songs’ choruses, not any objective information about how 
the choruses were actually perceived. In the past, this kind of information 
about aesthetic salience was largely unknowable; hunches were all judges 
could go on. Today, imaging technologies offer an empiric and finer-
grained portrait of aesthetic choice.173  
Aesthetic salience can be diagnosed in a variety of ways. Neuroaesthetic 
researchers often equate such salience with pleasure.174 As the cognitive 
psychologist Steven Pinker writes, art’s primary function is to “press our 
pleasure buttons.”175 Pleasure facilitates the brain’s attentional networks as 
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pleasurable sensations prompt a reallocation of cognitive resources for 
enhanced processing of a stimulus.176  
A related subject of neuroaesthetic research is how audiences recognize 
beauty—a logical avenue of inquiry given beauty’s role in the popular 
imagination as the primary criterion for making aesthetic judgments.177 One 
might question the ability to interrogate something as seemingly amorphous 
as beauty. We have all heard the saying that beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder. But scientists searching for the biological signs of perceived 
beauty contend that the “neural activity seems to be detectable and 
quantifiable, which makes it apt for empirical investigation.”178 Cultural 
differences exist, but there is also a shared, unconscious sense of what is 
attractive.179 
Some work finds that the experience of beauty has its own unique neural 
signature. Scientists have identified “a single faculty of beauty into which 
different senses feed.”180 When audience members are asked to rate stimuli 
as either “ugly,” “indifferent,” or “beautiful,” the stimuli designated as 
“beautiful” generate particular brain behaviors. Multiple experiments 
correlate the experience of beauty with activity in a particular area of the 
brain: the medial orbit-frontal cortex or mOFC. 181  Other studies 
demonstrate links between patterns of neural activity across the brain and 
the experiences of aesthetic contemplation and pleasure.182 
It is not just that brain-imaging tools offer a clue as to when an observer 
or listener will consider something to be beautiful. Neuroaesthicians are 
more ambitious, leveraging their current understandings to develop ways to 
calculate the strength of an aesthetic response. In one highly publicized 
study, participants listened to unfamiliar fragments of music and were 
allocated a fixed sum that they used to “vote” on which fragments they 
would like to listen to again. The degree of neural activity in particular brain 
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regions predicted the amount of money participants were willing to pay to 
listen to their preferred fragments a second or third time. The activated brain 
regions had been ascertained from previous research to be integral to 
“emotional processing and value-guided decision-making.”183  Copyright 
law assumes that our intuitive reactions to art cannot be measured, but, 
according to the study’s authors, their findings reveal “a mechanism for 
valuation of stimuli with abstract importance.”184 Neuroscientists envision 
a near future where they can calculate the depth of an audience’s aesthetic 
reactions. As two leaders in the field contend, “the subjective experience of 
beauty and of ugliness can be objectively ascertained and measured” and 
will “take aesthetics very much into the subjective, though quantifiable, 
arena.”185  
Admittedly, there is more to aesthetic processing than experiencing 
beauty and pleasure. Both cognitive psychologists and philosophers agree 
that dislike, disgust, and other aesthetic emotions are important as well.186 
But the subjective experience of beauty is directly linked to the sensation of 
pleasure, something that is assuredly at the heart of aesthetic judgment.187 
In general, there is a significant overlap between the basic hedonic pleasures 
we experience through activities like sex and eating and the higher-order 
pleasures we associate with aesthetic experience.188 Consciously or not, we 
find these experiences rewarding and fMRI and EEG technologies have the 
ability to reveal when the mind’s reward center has been activated from such 
experiences.189 
As noted, in seeming agreement with neuroaesthetic research, courts 
articulating the audience test speak of “beauty” and “pleasure,” encouraging 
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the trier of fact to examine their subjective experience of the works at issue 
for those qualities and feelings.190 Those same courts may be unwilling, 
however, to equate aesthetic reward with the reward from stroking a 
romantic partner’s hair or eating a mouth-watering cheeseburger. 191 
Fortunately, neuroscience offers the potential for separating the sensory 
rewards of art from other experiences. As Gabrielle Starr writes in her 
investigation of the aesthetic experience of beauty, “[t]he finding that 
reward activations for painting straddle both the dorsal ventral regions of 
the striatum begins to support the possibility . . . that aesthetic rewards may 
be processed differently.”192 Starr goes on to note that research shows not 
only a particularity in how aesthetic rewards are processed in the brain but 
also in how those rewards are integrated. Aesthetic experience, like other 
pleasurable experiences, integrates reward signals to engage emotional 
processes. But this engagement involves a particularly large, integrated 
system in the brain—the default mode network—that is not necessarily 
activated in response to other sensory rewards.193 The default mode network 
is associated with introspection and self-assessment, making it a likely locus 
of activity for aesthetic judgment.194 
In a related vein, there is a measurable biological difference between the 
reward received from a stimulus someone “likes” and the reward received 
from a stimulus someone “wants.”195 It is hypothesized that liking—what 
the neuroscientist Anjan Chatterjee describes as “pleasure without an 
acquisitive impulse”196—is what it means to experience aesthetic pleasure. 
We can enjoy a painting without thinking we need to take it home. One 
neuroscientist contends that “the central question regarding the rewarding 
dimension of aesthetic experience is to shed light on the difference between 
‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ processes.”197 If the aesthetic pleasure at issue in the 
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audience test is the pleasure from liked but not wanted rewards, then perhaps 
an ability to determine when the neural signature for liking has been 
triggered upon experiencing a particular creative work could be relevant to 
substantial similarity.198 
It is important to state here that neuroscience is not yet at the point where 
such measurements are reliable or specific enough to determine the 
substantial similarity analysis. The overlap between aesthetic pleasure and 
other sensory pleasures can be difficult to disentangle as is the difference 
between “liking” rewards and “wanting” rewards. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of a future where aesthetic judgment lends itself to quantification 
deserves serious consideration. A roadmap to the particular aspects of 
creative works that produce the greatest devotion of attentional resources 
and prompt the most pleasurable sensations in their audiences would seem 
to be just what the substantial similarity analysis cries out for. Instead of 
guessing at the salience of a particular musical passage, the trier of fact 
could be provided with neural proof of that passage’s salience. Some 
tangible evidence of aesthetic response, even if incomplete, might be better 
than the current legal black box for understanding audiences.  
Admittedly, at this point, neuroscience can only offer a very partial 
picture of aesthetic reaction; it can only serve as a supplement to, not a 
substitute for, the current substantial similarity inquiry. As the author of one 
copyright treatise writes regarding the use of psychological research more 
broadly, “[t]hese inquiries would not supplant the ordinary observer test, 
but instead assist in understanding how much weight the ordinary observer 
should give to similarities and differences.”199 Neural imaging is not a cure-
all, but it would be an improvement over the status quo if a court could make 
a more informed decision as to the aesthetic relevance of a particular 
musical passage instead of relying on complete guesswork (as in the case 
involving Usher and Justin Bieber).200 
Most importantly, even if brain imaging is unlikely to be accepted as 
evidence in individual copyright cases in the short term, neuroaesthetic 
research will force courts to abandon the current assumption that any 
objective analysis of aesthetic response is impossible. The audience test 
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operates under the belief that our aesthetic experiences cannot be measured. 
As a result, substantial similarity decisions are not specified by the trier of 
fact or interrogated by courts in review. This, in turn, makes it extremely 
difficult to dispose of the issue of substantial similarity before trial. 
Copyright law exhorts triers of fact to examine their experiences of “beauty” 
and “pleasure” in deciding infringement claims yet offers little to no 
guidance for what those legally relevant sensory categories should mean. 
Even if neuroaesthetics cannot yet fully break down our experiences of 
aesthetic pleasure and beauty, it calls into question copyright law’s refusal 
to countenance any objective analysis of how we respond to creative works. 
2. Immediacy 
As discussed, the audience test assumes that aesthetic judgment is both 
rapid and stable.201 This assumption has consequences for the copyright 
infringement analysis. It is the lay observer’s “immediate response” and 
“spontaneous reaction” that is relevant to identifying the protectable essence 
of the copyrighted work. Any longer appreciation of the work is considered 
illegitimate, either because courts assume that any later evaluation of the 
work will alter the original judgment or because the audience’s instant 
experience is deemed a better proxy for the market behavior of interested 
patrons. Dissection is discouraged because such an analytical approach 
seems unlikely to improve outcomes if the goal is to recreate the actual 
speed at which audiences evaluate creative expression. 
Neuroscientists investigate the temporal dynamics of aesthetic judgment, 
something that has only been guessed at by the federal courts.202  Their 
research has coalesced around a two-phase description of the timing 
involved in aesthetic appreciation. 203  First, there is an initial implicit 
processing phase that captures “low-level” features of the perceived object. 
Second, there is a higher-level processing phase involving “a deeper 
aesthetic evaluation.”204 
The critical thing to note here is that both phases take place rapidly. The 
first low-level phase occurs 300–400 milliseconds after presentation of a 
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stimulus. The second phase takes place almost immediately thereafter, 600 
milliseconds after stimulus presentation.205 Much happens in this short time 
frame. An observer’s brain can process the content in an artwork in 10 
milliseconds and the artwork’s style in 50 milliseconds.206  
This research shows that aesthetic judgment occurs instantaneously, in a 
similar fashion to the “spontaneous reaction” described by the courts.207 
Strong preferences form in this short window as the brain conducts both 
sensory and semantic analyses of the stimulus at issue.208 Judgment of a 
creative work’s beauty occurs in a split second.209  
Our aesthetic judgments are not just rapid, but reliable. Within 750 
milliseconds, listeners can judge how much they like a musical excerpt and 
do so with a high degree of accuracy, i.e., the judgment about that excerpt 
remains the same even after hearing the entire piece.210 One might think that 
past experiences with both similar and different creative works, as well as 
other relevant memories, would be determinative in this process. Yet 
research reveals that we do not need to comb through our frames of 
reference to enjoy art. “[A]esthetic pleasure comes into being without 
analysis, consideration, or reliance on—or reference to—former perceptual 
experiences.” 211  Our previous experiences are relevant to aesthetic 
appreciation, but they are not necessary. 
Proving the speed at which aesthetic judgments occur is important 
because the faster these judgments, the more one can argue that there is little 
time in this process for objectively weighing a work’s different components. 
One cognitive scientist puts it this way: “Since the timescale of the brain’s 
functional activity is in the order of milliseconds, complex processes take 
place very quickly, leading to a qualitative, simple subjective conclusion 
about the beauty of a stimulus.”212 
The other important insight neuroscience provides with regard to the 
timing of aesthetic experience is that our aesthetic responses fade over time. 
For a long while, psychologists have believed that audiences exhibit 
“aesthetic fatigue” after experiencing a stimulus too often or for too long of 
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a period of time. 213  Neuroscientists confirm this phenomenon, 
demonstrating that neurons in the brain regulate movements meant to orient 
an observer to a surprising stimulus but that when the surprise event is 
repeated, a habituation takes place that decreases this neural response.214 
This discovery allows one to measure the speed at which aesthetic responses 
decrease over time.215 
Relatedly, neuroaesthetic research examines the roles that familiarity and 
novelty play in aesthetic judgment. Although a certain amount of familiarity 
can be attractive and enhance a work’s aesthetic appeal, most observers 
respond positively to novelty. In fact, there is some evidence that all positive 
aesthetic evaluation requires some degree of novelty. Research into 
audience appreciation of music reveals that novelty is critical to attention to 
and favorable evaluation of musical works. As the perception of novelty 
declines, so do favorability ratings. 216  Neural activity can reveal when 
someone is experiencing a reaction of surprise.217 In fact, there are even 
specific “novelty neurons” as well as “familiarity neurons” identified by 
researchers.218 Novelty may be a particularly important characteristic to 
identify as the activity of these novelty neurons predicts the likelihood we 
will form a memory of the stimulus.219  
Although it would be difficult to accurately discern the degree of 
audience familiarity or novelty in a creative work such that this information 
could be used in the substantial similarity analysis, these findings confirm 
current judicial understandings of the speed and durability of aesthetic 
judgment. Casual, fast reviews of stimuli provide the best window into the 
aesthetic experience. Lengthy deliberations over the merits of a creative 
work can distort or partially obscure those merits.220 Hence, neuroaesthetic 
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research offers evidentiary support for the substantial similarity status quo 
when it comes to the temporal dynamics of aesthetic judgment.221 
C. Concerns and Limitations 
Neuroaesthetics is not without its skeptics. Some worry that, despite 
advances in spatial resolution and processing speed, imaging technologies 
cannot hope to describe a cognitive process as complex as aesthetic 
judgment.222 Others contend that neuroscience offers nothing to the study of 
aesthetics because it posits biological causation for a process that is much 
more ethereal.223 Finally, there is a concern that neuroaesthetics fails to 
capture the real world context of artistic appreciation.224 
It is true that the process of aesthetic judgment is complex. Even though 
it occurs incredibly quickly, aesthetic judgment relies on a host of mental 
processes—perception, cognition, and affect—in a dynamic process. Critics 
who complain that aesthetic judgment cannot be located in one area of the 
brain are right.225 It will not be possible for researchers to look at a single 
biological unit to determine when someone is processing artistic stimuli. 
Nor will judges be able to look for activation in one neural terrain to 
determine if an audience will recognize one creative work as coming from 
another. Moreover, because many of the neural processes behind aesthetic 
response also apply to other sensory experiences, researchers need to be 
careful to avoid the problem of reverse inference. It is useful to discover that 
engaging in a particular cognitive process—like a judgment that a creative 
work is “beautiful”—produces activity in particular brain regions. But it is 
not fair to infer that activity in a particular brain region always signals that 
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the subject is engaging in a particular cognitive process.226  
The neural circuity of aesthetic response is complex, but it is not 
unknowable nor is it hopeless to expect to understand it better. Scientists 
realize that they need to study neural networks acting across the brain at 
different times and not just the activity of a single region. At this point, 
neuroscientists are not looking for an “art button” in the brain. Instead, they 
apply advanced cognitive models that involve multiple brain regions and 
overlapping neural networks.227 As noted, particular attention has been paid 
to the default mode network, a neural circuit that constantly measures the 
sensory environment and, hence, appears germane to the processing of 
artistic stimuli.228 Other networks track the reward value of a stimulus, 
which can be useful in determining what is pleasing to the ear of an audience 
member.229 The problem of reverse inference is a concern, but it requires 
caution before attributing neural activity solely to an aspect of the aesthetic 
experience, not a wholesale abandonment of neuroaesthetic research.  
Skeptics might press their point by maintaining that even if researchers 
acknowledge the biological complexity of the aesthetic experience, that 
complexity represents a barrier to understanding audiences that researchers 
have yet to cross. Scientists have gotten better in the last decade at decoding 
the different brain regions involved in aesthetic encounters, but they are still 
far removed from answering some of the basic questions one might want to 
know to fully comprehend the physiology of audience reaction. For 
example, at this point, when someone recognizes a particular stimulus, brain 
scans cannot determine whether the person is relying on a true memory (i.e., 
something that really happened to the person) instead of a false one.230 The 
philosopher John Hyman questioned what good can come of neuroaesthetic 
study if we cannot tell if an audience member viewing an image of a 
voluptuous woman is responding to the artistry used to create the image or 
sensuous impulses one might feel regardless of creative technique.231  
Hyman is right that neuroscientists have not cracked the code on exactly 
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what makes aesthetic experiences unique. But they are aware of this. 
Experimenters routinely caution that aesthetic responses overlap with other 
biological processes and that reactions to creative works can look the same 
as reactions to other stimuli.232 Aesthetic experiences involve many of the 
same biological processes as other experiences, but this does not make their 
study useless. As it stands now, the audience test offers no predictive ability 
for litigants or content for courts in review. Insights into how audiences 
process creative works (and confirming that there is indeed a unique biology 
to aesthetic thought) represent an improvement from the status quo even if 
it is not yet possible to identify every part of what makes aesthetic responses 
unique. 
Hyman’s critique also seems to fault neuroscientists for not offering an 
answer to a question that has haunted aesthetic philosophers for centuries. 
He rightly contends that fMRI imaging cannot tell us what should be 
considered art and what should not. 233  But it is not necessary for 
neuroscience to resolve this philosophical conundrum before it can help us 
understand the aesthetic experience. Brain scans will never be able to 
explain what makes for good artwork. Instead, neuroaesthetics can provide 
information on the biological mechanisms behind the enjoyment of some 
artworks but not others.234 If one defines aesthetics to include the study of 
all stimuli generating positive emotions, then it would seem that 
neuroscientists can provide valuable information on aesthetic responses.235 
This may not match Hyman’s definition of aesthetics, but that is not the fault 
of scientists trying to describe a mental process while avoiding making 
normative claims about art appreciation.236 
Other objections to neuroaesthetic study are more specific.237 One might 
question the ability of neuroscientists to recreate the real-world conditions 
of aesthetic judgment. This is important because the substantial similarity 
test calls for the trier of fact to experience creative works in the same manner 
as their intended audiences.238 Seeing an image of a painting while being 
scanned in an fMRI machine is not the same as seeing the original in a 
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museum. Experiments often confront participants with long successions of 
artworks divorced from their typical context.239  
Those working in neuroaesthetics are sensitive to these concerns. 
Contexts have been varied in an effort to determine when a contextual 
change will influence the neural processes behind aesthetic judgment. For 
example, researchers try to partially recreate the art museum context by 
telling some subjects that the images they are viewing are “gallery art.”240 
And not all studies are undertaken in artificial lab conditions. Researchers 
have sampled the reactions of actual museum visitors and live concert 
goers.241 Moreover, as the technology for neural imaging becomes more 
portable, the opportunities for recreating the context surrounding creative 
works will only multiply. Already, in private industry and in government 
studies, researchers use portable EEG devices to measure subjects’ neural 
responses in shopping malls and on battlefields.242 
In sum, neuroaesthetic research offers information that could be relevant 
to copyright law’s infringement analysis in a variety of ways. First, it both 
confirms and calls into question some background assumptions underlying 
the audience test. Aesthetic response operates automatically, supporting the 
current approach to evaluating substantial similarity in a way that avoids 
labored deliberation over the similarities in two works. These responses 
differ greatly, however, depending on the type of art form at issue and the 
level of familiarity the audience has with the art form. Copyright law’s 
current insistence on a uniform approach to audience and art work fails to 
capture the biological realities of the aesthetic experience. Second, 
neuroaesthetics suggests ways to potentially measure the strength of 
aesthetic responses. Current technologies do not allow for an inquiry into 
all aspects of aesthetic encounters, but the ability to assess audience reaction 
when experiencing a creative work represents a marked improvement over 
the black box that currently houses the substantial similarity analysis. 
Although there are many limitations on our ability to use neuroscience to 
comprehend audiences, copyright law does not insist on perfect 
understanding; it only looks to an aggregate appreciation. The next Part 
wrestles with the normative implications of a neuroaesthetic approach to 
substantial similarity, asking whether the improved understanding of 
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audiences explored in Parts I and II can actually improve the quality of the 
copyright infringement analysis. 
III. IS NEUROAESTHETICS GOOD FOR COPYRIGHT? 
It might seem that any tool that helps courts better understand the thought 
processes of audiences should be embraced to improve the quality of 
infringement decisions. There are reasons, however, to be cautious when 
importing scientific insights into copyright doctrine. Ultimately, the 
substantial similarity test involves a policy decision. A better understanding 
of audiences could make the copyright infringement analysis worse, not 
better, if such an understanding is not aligned with the underlying normative 
considerations that justify copyright protection.243  
After offering some thoughts on neuroaesthetics’ normative 
implications, this final Part examines not only what related changes would 
be good for copyright law but also what is possible. The historical record 
shows that it is only in a particularized zone of insight—one that challenges 
current understandings but does not clash with fundamental legal 
precepts—that law and psychology are successfully married. To influence 
copyright law, any reform efforts based on neuroaesthetic discoveries will 
need to fit within this zone as well. Three doctrinal suggestions—(1) using 
experts to tailor the substantial similarity analysis to different kinds of 
artistic works; (2) accepting survey evidence to better understand the 
aesthetic responses of specialized audiences; and (3) reordering the 
infringement analysis to debias judges and jurors—steer this middle course 
while promising to improve the law of copyright infringement.  
A. The Normative Implications of a Neuroaesthetic Approach to 
Infringement 
Thanks to a nineteenth-century view of audience reaction to creative 
works as unavoidably subjective, copyright law’s substantial similarity 
analysis has been on auto pilot for decades. Cognitive neuroscience 
demonstrates that the audience test rests on some flawed assumptions about 
the measurability and generalizability of the aesthetic experience. Armed 
with neural data, courts could begin to recalibrate the substantial similarity 
analysis in accordance with the ways our minds really think. 
Neuroaesthetics may also prompt a willingness to replace copyright’s 
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current one-size-fits-all approach to understanding audiences, instead 
placing more emphasis on the actual likely listeners and observers for 
different kinds of creative expression. 
Before rushing to reform the substantial similarity analysis, however, we 
should first ask some fundamental questions. Just because aesthetic 
response can now be measured does not mean that those measurements 
should guide the infringement determination. There are reasons to be wary 
of using scientific measurement. Those worried that such measurements 
will do violence to the humanistic values embedded in copyright law may 
call for their continued exclusion. A contrasting position, one that advocates 
for purging aesthetic considerations from the infringement calculus 
altogether, would have the same effect: stopping neuroscience’s influence 
on copyright law before it can get started. I address these two concerns 
before turning to some specific and realizable recommendations for 
importing neuroscientific insights into the substantial similarity analysis in 
light of copyright law’s normative commitments. 
1. Copyright Law and the Two Cultures 
There has long been a sense that science is at odds with art appreciation. 
Science and the humanities represent “two cultures,” with the former being 
described as objective and the latter defined by its insistent subjectivity.244 
This dichotomy is inscribed not only in popular perception but also in the 
law of intellectual property. The Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause 
separates the “Sciences” from the “useful Arts,” prompting divergent legal 
approaches to the two categories.245 Patent law categorizes the sciences as 
susceptible to a qualitative measure of “Progress.” By contrast, courts posit 
that such a measurement is not possible for copyright law. The arts are 
described as necessarily “useless” and their progress only loosely tied to the 
sheer quantity of such works generated.246  
For some, any proposal to welcome neuroscientific evidence of audience 
reaction into copyright law risks violating the theoretical and constitutional 
separation of these two realms. At its heart, neuroaesthetics forces a partial 
reconception of our experience of creative works, painting this experience 
as a matter of biology. This shift can be jarring for its implied displacement 
 
244. C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES (Canto ed. 1993); see also Peter Lee, Patent Law and the 
Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 11–15 (2010) (contrasting the different “cultures” of patent and 
copyright law). 
245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
246. Beebe, supra note 74, at 358; see also id. at 359 (quoting Justice Holmes: “one of the grounds 













of longstanding cultural considerations. 247  Perhaps some injection of 
empirical assessment into aesthetics can be tolerated, but, if too concerned 
with finding objective answers, neuroscientists may create those answers 
even if they do not truly describe what makes art pleasurable to audiences.248 
It does not help that the things being studied—“beauty,” “pleasure,” 
“similarity”—lack universally accepted definitions. The vague, undefined 
nature of aesthetic experience, it is feared, will give scientists too much 
leverage to impose their own definitions.249 As one philosopher wrote with 
regard to psychological studies of art appreciation, “I am convinced that the 
problem of the description of the nature of aesthetic experience is not a task 
to which the techniques of empirical science are relevant.”250 Anxious art 
historians and critics complain that neuroscientists rarely consult their work 
when charting new discoveries in aesthetic science.251  
A related critique when it comes to neuroaesthetics stems from the 
tendency of neuroscientists to study “classic” artistic representations, 
thereby embedding—in a supposedly objective analysis of aesthetic 
experience—their own tastes and predispositions. Many neuroaesthetic 
experiments expose subjects to paintings and sculptures in what would now 
be considered traditional styles. At the same time, by searching for the 
biological signs of aesthetic beauty and pleasure, neuroscientists can be 
accused of reifying outdated aesthetic theories.252 For example, art critic 
Blake Gopnik accuses neuroscientists of using their enhanced ability to 
study viewer sensations to only chase an old-fashioned view of art as 
dependent on a work’s formal properties.253 Better to investigate the work’s 
meaning, and related social and historical backdrop, he says, which cannot 
be elucidated so easily through neural imaging.254 Otherwise, the scientists 
conducting neural studies of audiences will impose their own artistic tastes 
on copyright law, giving short shrift to conceptual art or other artistic 
movements that do not square with an old, Enlightenment view of 
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It seems wrong, however, to insist that our understanding of aesthetic 
experiences cannot be improved by new knowledge of neural architectures. 
Neuroscientists need to be careful about instantiating eighteenth-century 
theories of aesthetics into experiments meant to track how twenty-first-
century audiences perceive creative works. A single-minded focus on 
“beauty” would recreate the way eighteenth-century philosophers thought 
about art, but do a disservice to particular kinds of creative works.256 Studies 
involving only classical works of art will of course privilege certain art 
forms over others. But researchers are increasingly evaluating different 
kinds of art, including conceptual art.257 In its earliest stages, it made sense 
for neuroaesthetic study to focus on works of art that enjoyed the most 
popular acclaim, thereby minimizing individual variance when it comes to 
perceiving a work as “beautiful.” This prompted a reliance on more 
traditional works. But it seems likely that a broader description of the 
different inputs for aesthetic experience will come as the body of scientific 
studies grows. 
Nor is it impossible to conceive of a new understanding of aesthetic 
encounters that borrows from both of the two cultures. Despite treating 
science and art as two separate subjects, copyright law and patent law 
sometimes borrow from each other,258 a cross-pollination that can be viewed 
as a strength and not a weakness. 259  Neuroaesthetic data, rather than 
replacing the reported aesthetic reactions of observers and listeners, can act 
as a valuable supplement to articulated notions of beauty, pleasure, and 
similarity. Part of the value of neuroaesthetic study is that it can supply 
evidence of mental processes that individuals cannot perceive or describe 
on their own.260 Yet the goal is not to ignore conscious explorations of 
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aesthetic encounters. Scientists check fMRI data derived from experiments 
on brain function against “reliable first-person accounts of consciousness,” 
rather than replace reported descriptions of aesthetic experience 
altogether.261 Objective evidence of audience reactions can be incorporated 
into the substantial similarity analysis without independently defining it. 
Doctrinal innovations can rely on neuroscientific findings to help inform the 
substantial similarity analysis without completely determining that analysis.  
A related concern comes from the danger outside evidence of audience 
reaction poses to aesthetic pluralism. Although the overwhelming scholarly 
consensus is that the substantial similarity test needs more definition, for 
some, this lack of specificity should be considered a feature, not a bug. For 
example, Shyam Balganesh celebrates the undetermined nature of the test. 
Because it is so difficult to determine a work’s aesthetic value and whether 
that value has been appropriated by the defendant, the audience test affords 
the trier of fact the opportunity to consider more than the economic effects 
of the appropriation, allowing for “the introduction and instantiation of 
plural values into the copyright analysis.” 262 
In a related vein, Brian Soucek warns against the legal imposition of 
aesthetic orthodoxy. 263  Soucek does not caution against aesthetic 
discrimination because judges are ill-equipped to make aesthetic judgments 
or because the subjective nature of aesthetic judgment makes any attempt to 
determine the “best” aesthetic approach a losing proposition. Rather, he 
submits that the First Amendment commands aesthetic neutrality. 264 
Because some aesthetic judgment in the test for copyright infringement is 
unavoidable, one might conclude that the infringement analysis should be 
structured so that the state does not shrink the array of acceptable aesthetic 
choices.265 If the vagueness of today’s audience test aids this commitment 
to aesthetic pluralism, a more structured test, responsive to biological 
evidence of audience reaction, might do the opposite. 
Balganesh and Soucek are right to celebrate aesthetic pluralism as a 
worthwhile consideration, but some tension between the need for greater 
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specificity in the definition of infringement and the desire to protect 
aesthetic pluralism is inevitable. Copyright policymakers need to weigh the 
costs and benefits of one approach against another rather than valuing 
pluralism over all other values. The years of frustration voiced by copyright 
scholars and judges over the substantial similarity test testifies to a 
consensus that the law has moved too far along the spectrum toward 
plurality and away from predictability. Lack of specifics makes copyright 
cases notoriously expensive as even somewhat specious claims become 
incapable of resolution before trial. Predictability is not the only value at 
stake in copyright jurisprudence, but it should be a central one.266 
The audience test’s unbounded nature allows for bias. In its present form, 
the audience test not only defies predictability but also permits wide 
disparities in the success rates of infringement suits depending on artistic 
medium. Plaintiffs claiming infringement of a musical composition fare far 
better than those alleging improper appropriation of a literary copyright.267 
There may be good reasons for some of this discrepancy, but the problem 
with the current state of infringement law is that we have no way of finding 
out why the discrepancy exists. The infringement black box makes it 
impossible to discern potential failures in judgment. Perhaps the variance in 
infringement decisions reflects a desirable, ecumenical approach to art 
appreciation. But it also likely stems from decisionmaking errors, as when 
a jury bases its decision on unprotectable attributes of the plaintiff’s work 
or on a retributive impulse after learning the defendant engaged in some 
intentional copying.268  
Given these considerations, some potential sacrifice of aesthetic 
pluralism in favor of a more determined substantial similarity analysis is 
desirable. In addition, the specific reforms prompted by neuroaesthetic 
findings can be designed to do as little harm to pluralist values as possible. 
For example, one suggestion, described in more detail below, is to alter the 
infringement analysis to take into account the ways in which aesthetic 
encounters differ depending on the kind of work at issue.269 By leveraging 
neuroaesthetic findings to recalibrate the law of substantial similarity, 
copyright reformers can make infringement more determined while at the 
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same time avoiding a uniform approach to aesthetic judgment. 
2. Avoiding Aesthetics 
On the other side of the spectrum from those concerned with an overly 
circumscribed view of aesthetic reaction would be those who believe that 
aesthetic judgment should have no place in the infringement calculus at all. 
A frequent suggestion in the scholarly literature is to replace the vagaries of 
the audience test with a mechanism that more directly considers the 
economic harms of infringement.270 Such a change would better align the 
infringement test with copyright’s utilitarian goals, the argument goes, 
while also having the advantage of making infringement cases more 
predictable. 
There is also a doctrinal argument for purging aesthetic judgment from 
the substantial similarity calculus. An avoidance of aesthetic concerns 
would seem to follow what is “arguably the most influential copyright 
opinion the [Supreme] Court has ever produced.” 271  In Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes cautioned 
against decisionmakers making any sort of qualitative, aesthetic judgment 
when setting the boundaries of copyrightability.272 Out of fear of judicial 
bias in favor of traditional art and against the avant-garde, Holmes deemed 
it better to avoid any evaluation of aesthetic merit at all. For a century, 
Bleistein has influenced decisions about the standard for assessing whether 
a work was sufficiently original to enjoy copyright protection.  
Bleistein’s influence on the specific issue of copyright infringement has 
been more muted, but only because of the presumed impossibility of 
measuring audience reactions. By assuming that an audience’s aesthetic 
judgment was impenetrable, courts were able to believe the substantial 
similarity analysis avoided the imposition of any aesthetic orthodoxy. After 
all, if one could not discern how jurors arrived at their infringement 
determinations, then arguably one could not steer those determinations in 
any particular direction. The longstanding prohibition on expert testimony 
and audience surveys served as additional safeguards against influences that 
might violate Bleistein’s aesthetic non-discrimination principle when 
evaluating substantial similarity. 
Decisions about the admissibility of scientific evidence of aesthetic 
response tread much closer to an explicit qualitative judgment about art. 
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Judicial choices about the probativity of such evidence would require 
decisions about how to prioritize findings that audiences find particular 
aspects of a work to be “beautiful” or just “noise.” Rather than revising the 
audience test to incorporate this evidence and risk offending Bleistein, one 
might be tempted to jettison aesthetic concerns altogether. Such an anti-
aesthetic approach would render neuroaesthetics of no value for copyright 
law. 
There are a few reasons not to excise aesthetic concerns from copyright 
infringement, however. First, it may be impossible. As multiple scholars 
point out, judges frequently disclaim aesthetic principles in copyright cases 
while in fact relying on their own aesthetic sympathies to decide cases.273 
By maintaining that judges should not evaluate aesthetic merit, the Bleistein 
decision effectively adopts its own aesthetic theory, one that assesses 
aesthetic worth based on a work’s “commercial value.” 274  Considering 
evidence of aesthetic reaction would at least make judicial sympathies more 
transparent.  
Second, a non-aesthetic approach would likely substitute financial 
concerns for aesthetic ones. Some copyright scholars call for explicitly 
tethering commercial value to the infringement calculation. In 2010, a group 
proposed to change substantial similarity to “require the copyright owner to 
prove commercial harm in order to prove infringement of the owner’s 
exclusive rights.” 275  They maintained that this doctrinal reform would 
replace the audience test’s subjectivity with an objective way to ascertain 
when appropriation of a creative work is improper.276 
We should question whether an infringement determination based solely 
on market harm, and no longer reliant on aesthetic reaction, would make 
sense. First, to the extent copyright law is designed to preserve financial 
incentives for authors, it is likely that other components of copyright 
doctrine are already doing the job. The threshold question of eligibility for 
copyright protection depends more on a work’s potential marketability than 
its creativity.277 Copyright’s fair use defense also relies heavily on economic 
harm. In evaluating the defense, courts must consider four statutory factors, 
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including “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.” 278  The Supreme Court described this factor as the 
“single most important element [in determining] fair use,”279 and even as 
subsequent decisions have caused the fair use determination to evolve, 
federal courts continue to consider market harm to be of primary 
importance.280 
Second, doctrine meant to emphasize financial considerations can have 
adverse consequences. For many, copyright law has become an engine for 
inequality. Tethering copyright protection to market value has produced a 
star system where the biggest entertainment companies and the most well-
known celebrities gain the most from the law.281 Beebe cautions that the 
Bleistein decision, by employing “a market definition of aesthetic progress” 
in a supposed effort to avoid aesthetic discrimination, made the mistake of 
privileging the propertization of objects rather than valuing the creative 
process itself.282 Yoking infringement exclusively to market value could 
have its own pernicious effects. It could fuel an unthinking “if value, then 
right” tendency in intellectual property law, enlarging the scope of 
copyright without considering competing values like the need for a robust 
public domain to provide raw material for new works of authorship.283  
To address these concerns, non-economic values should remain part of 
the copyright infringement analysis. As Andrew Gilden persuasively 
argues, copyright decisions involving issues of copyrightability and fair use 
often employ economic rhetoric to justify the clandestine upholding of 
noneconomic interests such as sexual privacy, religious freedom, and 
democratic discourse.284 Gilden objects to the use of “market gibberish” to 
obfuscate the real values that are being vindicated in these cases.285 The 
substantial similarity test potentially serves as a mechanism for supporting 
and articulating these values. But, in its current incarnation, there is not even 
“gibberish” to rely on to determine what is going on.  
The answer is not to abandon aesthetic analysis altogether. If the subject 
matter of copyright protection makes such analysis unavoidable, then 
copyright law should change to make its selection of aesthetic principles 
 
278. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
279. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
280. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Decisions, 1978-2005, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 617 (2008). 
281. MARTIN SKLADANY, BIG COPYRIGHT VERSUS THE PEOPLE 3 (2018); Lea Shaver, Copyright 
and Inequality, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 117, 141 (2014). 
282. Beebe, supra note 74, at 351. 
283. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 
1575 (2005). 
284. Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1019 (2019). 
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open and notorious. As Gilden writes, “[i]f courts are going to engage in a 
deeply subjective endeavor, influenced by a wide variety of considerations, 
those considerations should at least be allowed to come to the surface.”286 
Aesthetic reactions can serve as a proxy for additional values beyond 
preserving the financial incentives of authors. Neurological measurement 
has the potential to make these values more legible and prevent courts from 
hiding behind an outdated, mystical view of aesthetic experience.  
B. The Right Way to Incorporate Neuroscience into Copyright Law 
Below I offer some suggestions for how neuroaesthetic findings can 
improve copyright infringement decisionmaking, using the lessons of 
neuroaesthetics to justify doctrinal reforms. These are general proposals that 
deserve further refinement in future work. They may not be realized 
immediately given the inertia of copyright lawmaking. Nevertheless, such 
reforms become increasingly likely as neuroaesthetics matures as a research 
field and courts grow more dissatisfied with the flawed state of the 
substantial similarity status quo. 
1. Different Aesthetic Approaches for Different Creative Media 
If there was ever a doubt that audiences evaluate different artistic media 
in different ways, neuroscience has put those doubts to rest. Particular areas 
of the brain process, store, and retrieve music, but are not activated by other 
types of creative expression.287 We tend to dissect musical works into their 
component parts while evaluating images holistically. This suggests that the 
common substantial similarity instruction that the trier of fact should assess 
whether two works have the same “look and feel” tracks actual audience 
experiences for some media but not others.288 
Neuroaesthetics shows that the answer is not to stick with a universal 
approach to substantial similarity regardless of art form. Instead, expert 
testimony is needed to help the trier of fact understand which aspects of a 
work will be most salient to audiences depending on artistic medium. For 
example, an expert could provide the trier of fact with knowledge that, for 
music, the similarity of a particular segment to another should be more 
telling than in non-music cases. Given the scientific evidence, jurors should 
not be told to rely on “total sound effect” when determining substantial 
 
286. Id. at 1081–82. 
287. OLIVER SACKS, MUSICOPHILIA: TALES OF MUSIC AND THE BRAIN 117–18 (2008); Margit 
Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music: Determining Whether What Sounds 
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similarity in music copyright cases as they are today.289 
Not every copyright case warrants expert testimony.290 Scientists have 
more insight into some kinds of aesthetic encounters than others, which 
should be reflected in the substantial similarity analysis. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, abstract art prompts more varied aesthetic reactions than 
representational art.291 Neuroscientists have had more success at isolating 
emotional reactions to musical works than other creative works.292 This 
might mean that music cases or representational art cases can begin to utilize 
neural evidence whereas other infringement matters will need to wait until 
our understanding of the relevant aesthetic reaction improves.293 Given the 
findings of neuroaesthetic research, the current prohibition on all expert 
guidance regardless of art form seems inappropriate. 
2. Surveying Audience Difference  
Neuroaesthetics demonstrates that copyright law’s general assumption 
of audience universality is wrong. Gender, familiarity with a particular art 
form, and other factors impact perception of creative works.294 Because 
there is more variability in audiences than the law has assumed, there needs 
to be further guidance from courts to allow the trier of fact to adopt the 
perspective of intended audience members. Surveys should be admitted to 
help judges and jurors understand different audiences. 
 
289. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 476 (1946) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
290. Gathering data on the perceptions and experiences of a target audience can be expensive and 
may not be worth it in the majority of copyright infringement cases. Thomas M.S. Hemnes, The 
Adaptation of Copyright Law to Video Games, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 226 (1982) (contending that the 
ordinary observer test “encourages judicial economy and avoids interminable expert testimony”). Other 
areas of the law, however, have not adopted complete prohibitions on such evidence despite its potential 
expense. 
291. Vessel et al., supra note 92, at 122. 
292. W. Tecumseh Fitch, Antje von Graevenitz & Eric Nicolas, Bio-Aesthetics and the Aesthetic 
Trajectory: A Dynamic Cognitive and Cultural Perspective, in NEUROAESTHETICS 59, 94 (Martin Skov 
& Oshin Vartanian eds., 2009). 
293. Not only would expert testimony help curb the influence of an idiosyncratic trier of fact who 
fails to represent the “ordinary observer,” but a medium-specific approach to substantial similarity would 
also do a better job of preserving the public domain than the universalist status quo. Artists rely on 
knowledge about how the brain perceives visual images. For example, even as we evaluate images 
holistically, we are deeply influenced by contrast. Yet this contrast, by itself, should not be protectable. 
It is a technique or, as one commentator writes, a “perceptual fact.” Moon Hee Lee, Note, Seeing’s 
Insight: Toward a Visual Substantial Similarity Test for Copyright Infringement of Pictorial, Graphic, 
and Sculptural Works, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 833, 860–64 (2017). With further study, neuroscience could 
offer a better means of separating unprotectable perceptual facts from protectable expression. Copyright 
law already applies a specialized test for determining when visual works are eligible for copyright 
protection. See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017). New 
information about how audiences appreciate different kinds of art shows that specialized tests for visual 
substantial similarity are also appropriate. 
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By prompting greater attention to the reactions of intended audiences, 
surveys would alter the infringement analysis to better track the financial 
and non-financial harms of infringement. To the extent that the substantial 
similarity test is meant to assess economic harm from the defendant’s 
copying, the reactions of people who will actually encounter the works 
provides a better sense of this harm than the reactions of the general public 
or individual triers of fact. Non-financial interests are also better represented 
by intended audience members. In her study of the reasons artists create, 
Jessica Silbey describes a desire to be known to a particular audience and to 
cultivate a favorable reputation among that audience as central motivators, 
not just a desire for financial remuneration.295  If so, it makes sense to 
position infringement according to the reactions of specific audiences for 
the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works. 
Surveys also offer the capability of assessing audience reactions in a 
rapid manner that resembles the “spontaneous and immediate” aesthetic 
experiences of audience members in the real world.296 If recreating audience 
aesthetic judgment is the touchstone for substantial similarity, then the 
jurors in the Led Zeppelin case should have been exposed to the relevant 
“Taurus” and “Stairway to Heaven” compositions quickly and then asked 
for their judgment. The limitations of the courtroom and the adversarial 
process make it difficult to determine the “gut reaction” of the “casual 
observer” to creative works, however. The trier of fact ends up seeing or 
hearing the works at issue multiple times and deliberating over their 
similarities or differences in a less than casual manner. By contrast, if 
conducted the right way, surveys could more accurately sample the 
immediate impressions of onlookers and then report that information to the 
trier of fact. 
Even if one believes that the aesthetic reaction of audience members is 
the right metric for evaluating infringement, there are prudential 
considerations when using surveys to gain insight into that reaction. Even 
the best survey that sheds light on how people respond to creative works 
cannot fully illuminate the complexities of this process. The concern here is 
that embracing survey evidence will somehow leave out critical parts of the 
aesthetic experience, potentially over or underprotecting deserving creative 
works.297 
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This objection deserves serious consideration and should help guide how 
surveys can be used to inform the substantial similarity analysis. Because 
our understanding of aesthetic reactions is far from perfect, survey evidence 
of those reactions should only serve as a supplement to the infringement 
calculation rather than the sole determinant.  
Nevertheless, surveys of intended audiences should be permitted to aid 
in the substantial similarity determination. As noted, copyright courts have 
been hostile to surveys, refusing to allow them into the infringement 
calculation at all.298 In the very few copyright cases weighing the value of a 
proffered survey, there have been unfortunate mistakes in survey design. 
The proffered surveys queried respondents on the likelihood of confusing 
the defendant’s work with the plaintiff’s work, an issue more relevant for 
trademark infringement than copyright infringement. 299  These mistakes 
may not be the fault of clumsy survey designs, but rather stem from the 
relative difficulty in figuring out how to interrogate particular audiences on 
their aesthetic responses. After all, one cannot simply ask audience 
members if they think one copyrighted work is “substantially similar” to the 
other.  
Yet it is not impossible to design a survey that is relevant to the 
substantial similarity analysis. Irina Manta suggests that open-ended 
questions allowing a respondent to choose a degree of similarity would be 
appropriate. For example, members of the target audience could rate the 
works at issue on a five-point scale, with one standing for “not at all similar” 
and five for “very similar.”300 Surveys could also ask audiences to identify 
the components of a copyrighted work that they found most noticeable or 
enjoyable. Neuroimaging may offer valuable data for survey design, 
indicating which parts of the works at issue are potentially most salient to 
the relevant demographic. 
Attention will also need to paid to the appropriate universe for a survey. 
Purchasing records and market analyses could define a survey universe 
based on the copyright holder’s existing and likely customer base. 301 
Because authors routinely are motivated to create with a particular audience 
in mind, contemporaneous evidence from the copyright holder may also 
shed light on the appropriate audience to survey.302 Parties will no doubt 
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argue as to whether a proffered survey polled a truly representative sample. 
Again, the perfect should not be the enemy of the good. Surveys are 
routinely accepted in other areas of the law, including trademark law, and 
courts are free to discount or even exclude a survey that takes too broad or 
too narrow of a sample.303 
Even if surveys offer incomplete information about audience thought, 
they would provide more inputs for appreciating audience mindsets, thereby 
prompting a salutary cognitive realignment. Today, we know little to 
nothing about how judges and juries arrive at their infringement 
determinations. Without guidance, people tend to evaluate scenarios from 
their own perspective.304 It is likely that decisionmakers in copyright cases 
are constantly failing to appreciate the perspective of relevant audiences, 
even on those few occasions when they are instructed by courts to adopt that 
perspective. They may need a legal nudge, in the form of survey evidence, 
to approach the substantial similarity analysis from a different point of view.  
3. Debiasing the Trier of Fact 
As discussed above, in its current, amorphous form, the substantial 
similarity test acts as a mechanism for importing societal norms into 
copyright law.305 Even if one thinks the test should remain a mechanism for 
reflecting these norms, this does not mean that it should operate as a vehicle 
for subconscious bias. In most areas of the law, we do not believe that the 
very act of setting boundaries on the mental calculations of the trier of fact, 
regardless of the content of those boundaries, renders those calculations 
unreliable. Jurors are not subatomic particles whose positions will 
inevitably be disturbed by the act of trying to locate those positions. 
Nevertheless, substantial similarity doctrine has long proceeded under just 
such a belief about the fragility of the trier of fact. Believing “that one 
simply could not reason about the aesthetic,” 306  courts tread extremely 
lightly, worrying that attempts to specify infringement will disturb jurors’ 
mental calculations. If this agnostic approach to substantial similarity was 
once justified given the absence of information as to how audiences actually 
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appreciate art, neuroscientific discoveries make the justification no longer 
tenable. The law is filled with mechanisms designed to debias and improve 
legal decisionmaking.307 Copyright infringement should no longer be any 
different.308 
Neuroaesthetic research argues for one concrete doctrinal debiasing 
innovation: the trier of fact should evaluate substantial similarity before 
determining whether actual copying took place. A common complaint about 
the current infringement paradigm is that judges and juries are biased by 
whatever determination they make about whether copying occurred when 
deciding whether that copying is improper. Keep in mind that there are two 
separate steps to the infringement analysis. 309  First, there must be a 
determination of whether copying took place. At this step, the trier of fact 
can be aided by expert testimony and may dissect the works into their 
component parts for comparison. Here, the decision is whether similarities 
are probative of copying, not whether that copying is substantial enough to 
be considered improper. Only after this first step is there a comparison of 
the target audience’s aesthetic response to the two works, an evaluation that 
currently precludes expert guidance or dissection. 
The problem with the present ordering of these two separate stages of 
the infringement analysis is that the copying in fact step may skew the trier 
of fact’s assessment of substantial similarity. The copying in fact analysis 
considers copying of either protectable or unprotectable expression as 
probative. The danger is that once any copying has been found, that initial 
finding will spill over into the separate question of whether this copying was 
improper. As one court noted, once a jury has been exposed to expert 
testimony on the separate issue of “copying in fact,” it cannot “forget that 
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evidence in analyzing the problem” of substantial similarity.310 
A way to help with this problem is to reverse the order of the two 
analyses. The trier of fact should decide substantial similarity first. If there 
is a conclusion that the two works are substantially similar, then there can 
be an examination of copying in fact.311 
Although one might worry that this resequencing will cause the 
substantial similarity analysis to improperly influence the copying in fact 
test, this seems less likely than the reverse. Copying in fact is much more of 
a structured analysis than substantial similarity. It permits analytical 
dissection and expert testimony about which kinds of similarities should be 
considered probative. As a result, even when substantial similarity is found, 
this finding is unlikely to stampede the more bounded copying in fact 
analysis. 
This idea about reordering the infringement decision has been suggested 
before.312  It should be given even more serious consideration given the 
teachings of neuroaesthetics. In addition to serving a debiasing function, 
reversing the order of the two components to infringement would better 
recreate the timing of aesthetic encounters. In an early formulation of the 
audience test, the Ninth Circuit proposed a waiting period between the 
observer’s experience of one work and her experience of another. The court 
described the test as inquiring whether an ordinary observer, “given an 
interval of two or three weeks between a casual reading of [plaintiff’s] story 
and a similar uncritical view of [defendant’s work],” would perceive the 
former in the latter.313 Although this staggered reading of the two works 
proved too inefficient to implement, the motivating idea seems to be that 
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the essence of creative works can best be ascertained through immediate 
experience with those works. Infringement should not be assessed by a 
labored comparison of one work to another, lest that creative essence 
somehow become overlooked or fade under the pressure of a more logical 
comparison. Better to engage in a fast, “casual” review in order to discern 
the work’s aesthetic value.314 In general, courts fear that too much time with 
a work causes deliberation to trump instinct, making the observer’s 
impression less probative of infringement. 315  Neuroscientific research 
reveals that there is some truth to these judicial suppositions. Reversing the 
order of the two central infringement determinations would help facilitate a 
more accurate rendering of an audience’s “spontaneous and immediate” 
impressions.316 
CONCLUSION 
The current substantial similarity analysis uses the aesthetic judgment of 
audiences to determine whether one work infringes the copyright of another. 
Copyright law deems aesthetic judgment inherently subjective and, 
therefore, not susceptible to measurement or the imposition of objective 
criteria. At the same time, the law considers aesthetic judgment universal, 
making attention to audience differences largely unnecessary. By offering 
empirical evidence of audience attention and pleasure, neuroaesthetic 
research refutes these judicial suppositions about art appreciation. It turns 
out both that we can measure aesthetic experiences to some degree and that 
these experiences vary depending on audience and artistic medium. 
Neural imaging of audiences is unlikely to replace the substantial 
similarity test wholesale. We won’t simply put sample viewers in fMRI 
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machines, expose them to the works at issue, and then look for one neural 
pattern for infringement and another for permissible copying. There are 
significant limitations on what brain-imaging technologies can detect when 
it comes to the complex neural processes involved in aesthetic judgment. 
Instead, as in other areas of the law, neuroscience seems ripe for making 
inroads into the infringement analysis without supplanting it. If done the 
right way, brain science can improve our controversial system for 
determining copyright infringement. We understand the audiences for 
creative works much better than we did even a few years ago. That 
understanding should be leveraged to rehabilitate the law of substantial 
similarity. 
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